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1. Introduction 
 
In the following Magisterarbeit I am going to develop a Concept Empiricist model of concep-
tual thought, which is in its technical core primarily inspired and motivated by Larry Barsa-
lou‘s Perceptual Symbol Systems Theory (PSST) (1999, 2008a). But it is not a theory of con-
cepts in the genuine sense only, but it also expands naturally on related topics like the ontol-
ogy of mind and the problem of intentionality. This is not arbitrarily chosen, but a natural 
consequence of any contemporary Concept Empiricist theory, for those theories are in kind 
direct outgrowths of an embodied approach to cognition which yields these consequences – 
the natural extension to related topics – as will be shown. 
The roadmap for the Magisterarbeit is going to look like this: First I will delineate the embod-
ied cognition framework. Within embodied cognition there is a plethora of differing attempts 
at explaining the diverse phenomena of higher and lower cognition which differ in the mean-
while tremendously from each other. Therefore it will be very useful to set clear boundaries 
between the differing approaches, which range from strong neural embodiment on the one 
side to a very promiscuous extended mind hypothesis on the other side, in order to make a 
clear case for Concept Empiricism. It will be also very helpful to set my favoured version of 
grounded cognition off against classical attempts at the phenomena which are to be explained. 
Following that I am going to present Larry Barsalou‘s Perceptual Symbol Systems Theory in 
more detail. I will do that to an extent which allows for an appropriate discussion of concept 
related phenomena, but which is not too lengthy. I will spare the reader with unnecessary psy-
chological or neurobiological details as long as it is not really necessary for explaining or 
clarifying the phenomena with which I deal here.  
Having done this I will discuss at great length conceptual meaning. In doing so I will present 
a presentational theory of meaning which is anti-realist, internalist and imaginistic. In adver-
tising for this theory I will recur to conceptual methods, intuition as well as to the empirical 
record. Next and related to this I will develop a resemblance based theory of intentionality 
which differs also widely from the already established theories of intentionality so far given. 
Indeed it possess a feature which makes it very distinct and this is, besides its reliance on pat-
tern mapping, the statistical grounding of resemblance which allows a cognitive theory of 
resemblance which is definite and therefore not open to the counterarguments generally mar-2 
 
shalled against related theories, which stress the importance of resemblance. A very distinc-
tive feature of this theory of intentionality is additionally that intentionality is seen as a capac-
ity which emerges naturally form the mental mechanism involved. As we will see, this is a 
distinctive advantage of it in comparison to other proposal in the field. 
A discussion of the ontology of mental states follows which is however primarily a discussion 
of mechanistic explanations and Bechtel‘s and McCauley‘s Heuristic Identity Theory (HIT). 
Those theories from philosophy of science and philosophy of cognitive science do not only 
deliver models for the ontology of mental states, but also epistemic criteria for evaluating a 
theory as superior or inferior. Especially the idea of productive continuity plays a role of piv-
otal importance in my Magisterarbeit. It might be a bit unfortunate that that an important con-
sideration is discussed nearly at the end of the Magisterarbeit, since I refer to it very often, 
however, I considered it as equally unfortunate to delay the discussion of meaning and inten-
tionality, which is already protruded by the overview chapter and the more technical parts, 
even more. Therefore I plead the reader to refer to later parts of the Magisterarbeit when it is 
necessary in order to understand earlier parts. 
In the course of writing I have gotten second thoughts regarding the adequacy of an ontology 
of mental states altogether, especially from the background of the theory of meaning and in-
tentionality delivered here. Therefore  I tried to  accommodate  for ontological  concepts  by 
means of a tentative phenomenological interpretation of them. Similar ideas influenced my 
deliberations regarding meaning too. I hope that this transition towards Phenomenology runs 
smoothly and that the high level of coherence which is my primary concern and something 
which I always strive for first is preserved.  
Further, I have dedicated a main chapter of the Magisterarbeit for possible and actual critics 
of the ideas brought forth by me. Besides the more classic standard objections there you can 
find a recent critique of the authors on which I refer most often. Naturally I try to refute any 
single criticism brought forth and I hope that the reader will approve my objection to the ob-
jections. 
I will round off the Magisterarbeit with some concluding remarks and prospects for future 
research.        
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2. From Embodied and Embedded Cognition to Grounded Cognition: 
Overview chapter. 
 
This chapter should be seen as a primer for the rest of the discussion. Its aim is to provide a 
short overview of Embodied and Embedded Cognition (EEC) for those who are not familiar 
with the theoretical landscape. Its character is therefore mainly reconstructive. Many terms 
are introduced which I will refer to in the rest of the Magisterarbeit but normally I will not 
give thoroughgoing definitions of them in this chapter but will do so in later parts of the the-
sis. 
The framework in which Concept Empiricism is embedded is Embodied and Embedded Cog-
nition. It aims at a new understanding of the phenomena of mind and cognition and has an all-
embracing scope regarding the philosophical problems involved, ranging from description 
and explanation of the ontology of the mental, to meaning, action, consciousness, self, etc. At 
the moment there is a huge variety of differing names and leading ideas behind this frame-
work and in order to give a better understanding of the methodological, conceptual and onto-
logical underpinnings of concept empiricism I am going to elaborate on that special version of 
Embodied and Embedded Cognition I am advocating. 
One major idea behind Embodied and Embedded Cognition is that the mind is a biological 
phenomenon which is embodied in the sense of being the brain (embrained) and the body or 
parts of them or being realized or brought about by them in a unique way only the species 
specific body can do (for the species specific cognition). It is clear that the brain is part of the 
body but the respective roles of the (extra-neural) body and the (neural body) brain in explain-
ing and ontologically defining the mind are differing much in different approaches. Therefore 
it might be helpful to differ between the respective parts of the whole organism. 
To have a grasp of what it means that the mind is embodied it is illuminating to call on the 
Johnson-Lakoff  Program  (Johnson  1987,  Lakoff  1987,  Lakoff  and  Johnson  1980,  1999). 
Mark Johnson and George Lakoff have tried to explain a large array of cognitive phenomena 
by  embodied  representations  and  their  metaphorical  mapping  on  even  the  most  abstract 
thought. For example, they have argued that concepts like UP and DOWN make only sense 
for a being with a body and a cognitive system for which these directions are salient in rela-
tion to their embodiment which might be very different for e.g. a jellyfish or a human. Fur-4 
 
thermore, they proposed that almost all of our concepts are metaphorically mapped from more 
―visceral‖ body-representations, but more on that later.   
Another important idea behind EEC is the importance of action for and in thought. There are 
many statements from different theories which claim that cognition and with it forms of con-
ceptual thought evolved for action. This claim comes in different degrees of strength. One 
very strong claim is that all forms of higher cognition are directly evolved for action which is 
reflected in their structure and function. This strong claim is exhibited in theories which re-
duce for example concepts to affordances (cf. Glenberg 1997) where ―affordance‖ is a term 
coined by J.J. Gibson (1979) and means possibilities of acting offered by an object to a spe-
cially embodied organism. To give a mundane example of this, take the different action pos-
sibilities afforded by a chair to a baby and a standard adult. Chairs afford for adults in stan-
dard situations primarily sitting but also more exotic possibilities of action as repelling an 
angry dog. None of this is the case for a baby which will maximally take a chair as a kind of 
shelter in the case of the angry dog. The idea is now to reduce concepts as bearers of meaning 
via affordances where affordances are the meaning of objects.  
Affordance theory properly reflects the importance of bodies, action and the evolutionary 
principle that cognition evolved for action. The importance of affordances is of a very high 
degree as we will see in the later parts of the Magisterarbeit, nonetheless they are only a sub-
set of what concepts are. 
The importance of action can be seen in other areas of philosophical interest as well. Take the 
self for example. There is a large philosophical industry to underline the self-sustaining and 
generating role of action. Be it the role of bodily action in the generation of a kind of self
1 like 
the generation of the embedded self in Neisser (1988) or the importance of the sense of 
agency for mental and bodily function (cf. Gallager 1995). There is an important distinction 
between those approaches which emphasize the role of action and those which primarily em-
phasize the sense of agency which stresses anew the importance of embodiment and in this 
case especially the importance of neural embodiment because the sense of agency can be seen 
as a neuro-representational mechanism alone, decoupleable from real action. 
The idea of the prevalence of action in cognition has another interesting philosophical impl i-
cation. Many attempts at concepts, intentionality and meaning within philosophy and cogni-
tive science  concentrated primarily at objective representation , e.g. usable for engaging in  
                                                           
1 Recently it is often assumed that there is no unitary core self but many selves with different roles. 5 
 
realist metaphysics and epistemology. Examples for this are abound as in the idea of concepts 
as necessary and sufficient conditions, extensional definitions of concepts, semantic proper-
ties like reference and truth-functionality, etc. If higher cognition is however something that 
evolved for bringing about action or at least relies on mechanisms that evolved for that aim 
then this attempt at the phenomena listed above becomes less plausible. The stance which 
stresses the cognition specifying role of species specific bodies is the second strand which 
attacks realist conceptions of cognition which is exhibited in different versions of body spe-
cific anti-realist or embodied realist sense-making (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Varela et al. 
1991, Clark 1997). So EEC also delivers a fresh new look at the realism – antirealism debate 
by taking action and embodiment seriously. 
Additionally, EEC is committed to environmental embeddedness of cognitive systems. This 
idea is different from that of giving action a pivotal role in cognition because it does state 
more than that there is an environment which an agent is acting upon. The environment can 
serve proponents of ECC as (i) a mind enhancing structure or (ii) as something in which the 
mind extends itself. (i) The idea of the environment as an enhancing structure is relatively 
straightforward. A nice example to illustrate that stems from Rumelhart el al. (1986). Imagine 
multiplying two large numbers, e.g. 7491 with 3954. This may be done under normal circum-
stances  with  pen  and  paper,  utilizing  environmental  structures.  More  classic  approaches 
would have engineered AI models which would have done this task totally internally. Rumel-
hart et al. (1986) assume by contrast that only primitive numbers are combined by e.g. rote 
learning and larger memory resources are spared by utilizing paper as a kind of memory store. 
Another example comes from Clark and regards playing Tetris. Classic theories from cogni-
tive science would have made playing Tetris a representational project totally internal to the 
cognitive system understood as a computational system within the brain without outsourcing 
some of the cognitive load on environmental factors. Contrary to what people normally do, 
namely heuristically pressing buttons of their gaming device in order to bring the tetrominoes 
(the rotatable blocks) in an appropriate position, which are then compared to the already exist-
ing structures by simple pattern mapping, you would have, according to GOFAI
2, rotated that 
blocks within your brain bound cognitive system
3 alone.  
                                                           
2 Good old fashioned artificial intelligence. 
3 The fact that within GOFAI that system is normally supposed to be brain  bound is primarily a result of plausi-
bly restricting the bounds of the cognitive system to the most plausible bearer of cognitive states: the brain. 
This does not entail for GOFAI proponents that this cognitive system must reflect structural features of th e 
brain.  6 
 
Another instance of that environmental involvement in cognition would be cultural scaffold-
ing. Cultural scaffolding is exhibited in kinds of cultural memory and learning were language 
allows for overcoming the limited cognitive capacities of single human memories and thereby 
saves those memories beyond the death of the single individual. Theorists like Donald (1991) 
and Tomasello (1999) take this capacity to culturally externalize knowledge and to be able to 
learn that knowledge as one of the few distinctive cognitive capabilities distinguishing hu-
mans from their evolutionary ancestors
4. (ii) The second claim that the mind is distributed 
over brain, body and the environment may sound somehow outlandish but it is indeed  an on-
tological position adhered to and defended by many contemporary philosophers.  And indeed 
it is the proper consequence o f the assumptions of classic  Functionalism together with the 
assumptions from GOFAI if they are taken seriously
5. This ontological position is called the 
Extended Mind Hypothesis or Extended Functionalism (cf. Clark and Chalmers 1998, Wilson 
2004, Wheeler forthcoming). I believe that it is not of greatest importance with regard to the 
content of my project to discuss this position here in more detail but I will come back to it in a 
while in order to make my place within EEC  clearer which may be of considerable intrinsic 
value.  
Some approaches at embodying cognition are more specific with regard to the vehicles of 
thought involved and are thus committed to claims about the ontology of mind in a manner 
more precise than some of the approaches already mentioned. With that I mean that they pro-
pose concrete inter-level mechanistic models (cf. Machamer et al. 2000) of cognition with the 
vehicles of thought mainly reflected by the parts of those mechanisms. Those more concrete 
approaches are advocated by Lawrence Barsalou (1999) or Vittorio Gallese and George La-
koff (2005). Their way of working seems to me to be the right kind of scientific procedure for 
it entails a model of an inter-level Heuristic Identity Theory (HIT) (cf. Bechtel and McCauley 
1999) which allows for more thoroughgoing ontological reflection and comparison with other 
philosophical theories of the ontology of mental entities. It will be helpful to do some com-
                                                           
4 It is possible to imagine many other cultural influences on stable biologically realized phenomena. For in-
stance we can speculate that secure and stable environments which are a product of social societies reduce 
stress and that this enhances intelligence. Another idea which is in principle inspired by the work of Elias (1994) 
is that processes of cultural disciplining which might be owed to means of social distinction might have yielded 
a durable enhancement of attention which is paramount for higher cognition. What is important with regard to 
any of these suggestions is that we can explain them with regard to important individuals involved via a kind of 
social psychology. We need not refer to obscure abstract external structures and processes which magically 
transcend individuals. 
5 To be honest it does not seem to be the “proper” consequence out and out in all the cases discussed by pro-
ponents of extended mind. Some of those cases allow for extending the mind because of a very coarse grained 
and often sloppy functional analysis or because of a confusion of task analysis with causal role analysis. 7 
 
parative work here, comparing EEC with Functionalism, to get an impression of the differ-
ences. However this comparison has to be rather sketchy for the mechanistic model of Barsa-
lou‘s perceptual symbol systems (PSS) can be expanded only at later parts of the Magisterar-
beit due to organizational problems of length and space. 
I start this comparison with a short delineation of the central points of what can be called the 
philosophical doctrine reflecting the classic GOFAI paradigm: Functionalism. Functionalists 
assume, as do those scientists committed to GOFAI, that mental states or events are normally 
realized by neural states or events but that this is also merely a contingent fact. This is so be-
cause mental entities are not identical with biological entities but only realized by them. Men-
tal entities are in their essence functional states, individuated e.g. through their causal role. 
This motivated naturally some tenets of Functionalism: The vehicle-content distinction (cf. 
Dennett 1991, Millikan 1993) and the anti-reductionist argument from multiple realizability 
(cf. Fodor 1974, Putnam 1967). The vehicle-content distinction claims in its most rigorous 
form a total distinction of vehicles of contents and contents themselves which is a clear case 
for arbitrary symbols like those of natural languages. The content DOG could be carried 
within a natural language by every other adequate word, e.g. ―refrigerator‖. To extend this 
picture of the mind there has to be something very similar to a Language of Thought (Fodor 
1975) or at least similar to amodal arbitrary mental symbols, which plays an important role 
within the mind. It is clear that this distinction varies strongly depending on the theoretical 
embeddedness. If content is individuated via classic semantic entities as reference or truth-
functionality it is somehow clear that there is a strong distinction. The distinction becomes 
less clear if contents are also mental states which is not only so in embodied theories of se-
mantics but also with varying degree in the GOFAI paradigm, e.g. in (solipsistic) functional 
role semantics (cf. Block 1986, Harman 1973) or microfunctionalism (cf. Clark 1993). 
The argument from multiple realizability is eventually the motivating principle for Function-
alism and so it is somehow difficult to say what comes inferentially first: multiple realizability 
or Functionalism? In spite of that indeterminacy of mutual support it can be claimed that mul-
tiple realizability is even today the stronghold of every anti-reductionist (cf. Wilson and Clark 
2009) and therefore it is worth taking a closer look at it
6. Putnam (1967) proposed eventually 
first that mental states are multiple realizable. His example was a comparison of pain in di f-
ferent biological genera where he concluded that the different neural implementations of pain 
in the different genera notwithstanding, the same mental state of pain is prevalent in the di f-
                                                           
6 I discuss multiple realizability in the chapter on the ontology of mental states at length.  8 
 
ferent cases. For example: A bird can feel and exhibit pain and so do I despite our different 
bodies, both neural and extra-neural.
7 So pain is an identical mental state or event which is 
different from its physical realization.
8 
A different and much more compelling example for multiple realization comes from Jerry 
Fodor (1974). It roughly goes like this: Think of what you can (i) do with money and think of 
what can (ii) serve the realizing function of money. (i) is roughly the functional role of money 
and is in most cases expressed in the form of buying and exchanging things.  This, which is 
relatively agreeable the main function of money, is very different from its realizers, e.g. bills, 
coins, credit cards, magnetic stripes or even shells in more archaic societies. So it seems that 
the function is what makes money money. The same way of thinking is analogously adapted 
to the realm of the mental. What is interesting of a mental process is its functional description 
made by philosophers or psychologists and not the correlates of these functional states in the 
brain.  Nonetheless, almost no one working in the field of philosophy of mind entertains 
doubts about the fact that the brain is the realizer of the mind or at least a very important part 
of it. What than is that new and revolutionary about EEC when it states that the mind is a bio-
logical phenomenon? 
The in my opinion  most interesting versions of EEC, those who emphasize  neural embodi-
ment of mental states, are those who have an answer to that question. These theories are deny-
ing multiple realizability, the content-vehicle distinction and the whole functionalistic pr o-
gram in its classic form or at least give the material at hand which allows denying them. The 
key to this procedure comes from taking mechanistic explanations and Heuristic Identity The-
ory seriously. I will explain later in the course of the  Magisterarbeit what a mechanistic ex-
planation and HIT are. For now it will suffice to know the following: Mechanistic explana-
tions and HIT together allow for specifying and adjusting different levels of explanation, 
reaching from the behavioural level to neurobiological one, by a kind of reflective equilibrium 
principle
9 (cf. Rawls 1971, Stich 1993). This model utilizes neurobiological data beyond its 
classic correlative interpretation
10 and instead uses them to specify the  contents and vehicles 
of higher level thought at a level higher than the biological one but nevertheless constraint by 
it. This is for example exactly what Larry Barsalou (1999) is doing in his Perceptual Symbol 
                                                           
7 It is somehow awkward that Putnam as a founding father of functionalism talks of pain and related mental 
states in birds and humans since both exhibit massively differing behavior. 
8 For a related view on multiple realizability and pain cf. Lewis (1980). 
9 The authors involved do not mention the reflective equilibrium principle in their theories. I mention it here in 
order to give the reader a hand with regard to imagining what those theories could be about. 
10 Compare Abraham et al. (2008) for a very old fashioned correlative interpretation of neurobiological data. 9 
 
Systems Theory when he determines the vehicles of thought by means of the brain areas in 
which higher level thought is enacted and then searches for an adequate vehicle which intelli-
gibly combines higher level thought with neuronal implementation. In this case the vehicles 
of thought constrain higher level thought by virtue of their structure and the role of function is 
primarily grounded in explanatory practice but not in ontological specification.  
Here we have a clear ontological statement regarding the vehicles of thought which differs 
massively from the varieties of non-reductive materialism like Functionalism. Explanations of 
the mechanisms involved in cognition are overwhelmingly constrained by lower levels. This 
new account is brought about by new findings in the behavioural and neurosciences as well as 
new models in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. 
Before I carry on with the discussion of EEC I want to state a further important difference 
between classic approaches in philosophy like Functionalism and EEC. The versions of EEC 
which stress the prevalence of embodiment have partly abandoned the language metaphor so 
dominant in philosophy for the last century. Language as the model of thinking was not only 
dominant in philosophy but also in cognitive science. This was surely primarily motivated by 
the ability of language to give a systematic picture of thought by means of syntax (cf. Fodor 
1975, Pylyshyn 1984) as well as by the circumstance that language was thought of as a pri-
mary vehicle of meaning. Especially the latter
11 however became seriously challenged (Har-
nad 1990, Searle 1980), but more on that later. For now it is important to see that those who 
take embodiment seriously predominantly abandon the language metaphor of mind which was 
hold in high esteem for nearly a century.  An alternative model with regard to the processes 
underlying thought as well as to concepts understood as bearers of meaning  is proposed on 
the pages to come. 
In order to give a rather comprehensive account of EEC it might be of interest to mention the 
schism lately emerging within the movement and as already mentioned above it might be of 
some discriminative value with regard to my own position to take a stand for one of the posi-
tions in the running. As eminent philosopher Andy Clark (2008), the founding father of the 
Extended Mind Hypothesis, correctly states, there seems to emerge a major separation within 
EEC along the lines of embodiment and embeddedness.  On the one side those philosophers 
rally round those who stress the fact that the neural and non-neural structure of our bodies has 
overwhelming impact on how we conceive of cognition. The other side maintains the impor-
                                                           
11 For a refutation of the former compare: MacWhinney (2005) or Langacker (2005). 10 
 
tance of the strongest form of embeddedness, namely the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Both 
sides are indeed committed to massively differing suppositions regarding the mental. The ad-
herents of the Extended Mind Hypothesis are obliged to a very promiscuous understanding of 
information processing (cf. Adams and Aizawa 2008), on classic Cartesian representations at 
least in off-line cognition (cf. Wheeler 2005) and to a computational theory of mind with re-
gard to the processes involved in order to express their thoughts about the distributed nature 
of thought. This is now totally at odds with what could be called the major tenets of embodi-
ment and generally seems to be a counterrevolutionary movement in order to preserve an ex-
tended version of Functionalism
12. 
Therefore a new array of names for different movements, which are more or less committed 
to one side of the continuum between the embodied and embedded extremes, has originated. 
Now, those who stress the vital role of embodiment rally round the flag of embodied ground-
ing (cf. Semin and Smith 2008) or grounded cognition (cf. Barsalou 2008b). I will do so too 
and will call the position defended in this thesis from now on grounded cognition. The com-
mitments on my behalf to embeddedness are more of a methodological and instrumental kind 
whereas the entities underlying the phenomena are constitutively located almost exclusively 
in the brain (contra Hurley 1998). This Magisterarbeit should be seen moreover located in the 
overarching field of Neurophilosophy (cf. Churchland 2002, Northoff 2004), which tries to 
explain most phenomena of philosophical interest by means of neuroscience and scientific 
psychology as does Analytic Philosophy with the help of linguistics or folk psychology
13. 
 
3. Perceptual Symbol Systems 
 
Here I want to introduce Perceptual Symbol Systems Theory as my favourite model for the 
explanation of concepts, meaning, mental processes, mental vehicles and intentionality. Be-
fore I argue for the superiority of PSST and its consequences with regard to these topics I just 
                                                           
12 There are additional problems as well which may be turned on the topic of a neuro-ontology (cf. Metzinger 
and Gallese 2003, Gallese and Metzinger 2003). Questions of high importance like the epistemological nature 
of space will eventually be treated with regard to the ontology and methodology involved very differently on 
both sides of the schism. For example: Is space ontologically primarily determined through physical space or 
through neuronal space? Is neuronal space a truth-maker for many statements via space perception and pat-
tern mapping or is space something to which we need epistemic access? 
13 It should be pointed out clearly that folk psychology is not the exclusive subject of Analytic Philosophy or 
philosophy more generally. It is dealt with in many fields of psychology, but primarily in social psychology (c f. 
Heider 1958, Nisbett and Ross 1980, Fiske and Taylor 2008).  11 
 
want to reconstruct PSST with regard to its main assumptions which allows for a smoother 
and more comprehensible discussion of the points mentioned above later in the text. In doing 
so I will concentrate on three of Larry Barsalou‘s essays on the topic: Perceptual Symbol Sys-
tems (1999), The Similarity-in-Topography Principle: Reconciling Theories of Conceptual 
Deficits (2003, together with W. Kyle Simmons) and Abstraction as Dynamic Interpretation 
in Perceptual Symbol Systems (2005). These essays seem to deliver the most detailed archi-
tectural approach at a Concept Empiricist understanding of the mind so far given. 
PSST is a theory of concepts and of those things which are carried by concepts: meaning, 
knowledge (in the non-epistemic sense), intentionality, etc. Its special contribution is its new 
look at the architectural features and vehicles which constitute the mind. It is important to 
appreciate that PSST is not a theory of concepts at the neuronal level alone. To the contrary, it 
is a high-level functional account of the systems that show how the brain could implement a 
conceptual system with the help of sensorimotor mechanisms (Barsalou 1999, p. 582).   
The main ideas behind PSST are that conceptual thought is quasi-perceptual and that meaning 
is grounded in perception. PSST tries to show that conceptual functions like type-token map-
pings, categorical inference, etc. can be exhibited by quasi perceptual-systems, at least with 
regard to the main vehicles involved
14.    
PSST is motivated by neuro-behavioural as well as by philosophical assumptions. The e m-
pirical assumptions are that there is no evidence at the behavioural and neurological level for 
classic arbitrary amodal language like models of concepts and that the conceptual processing 
of normal as well as neuronally impaired people accords well with imagery-like processing. 
The philosophical assumptions are concerned with the nature of meaning and intentionality 
and the idea that meaning as well as intentionality are only conceivable if they are grounded 
in imagery. Further philosophical assumptions stem from the area of philosophy of science 
and concern the explanatory nature of classic models of conceptual thought. The suspici on is 
that classic models are not falsifiable by empirical evidence and that they are overly ad hoc  
(see also Kosslyn et al 2006.). 
In order to get a grasp of PSST we should start with the most primitive functional component 
encountered within the theory: so called perceptual symbols. Perceptual symbols are records 
of neural states that underlie perception (Barsalou 1999, p. 582). As that they exhibit two im-
portant properties which distinguish them from e.g. language -like vehicles. They are both 
                                                           
14But see my discussion of amodality below, chapter 5.5 Meaning, subchapter (l). 12 
 
modal and analogical. Being modal is the property to be instantiated in the systems of the 
brain which are mainly dedicated to sensory processing. Being analogical means that they are 
somehow corresponding to the perceptual states, which they are records of
15, in structure or 
representational format.  A further feature which is entailed by that is that they are non -
arbitrary. They are constrained by the format of the perceptual vehicles in play.  
As records of neuronal states that underlie perception they are no t the vehicle or set of vehi-
cles underlying a perceptual state  themselves.  Rather they are schematic records of those 
states. Those schematic records correspond to that what is filt ered out by selective attention 
during perception. 
At this stage of analysis of PSST we encounter a first conceptual problem. Barsalou supposes 
that the stable and in this sense recorded parts of PSS are convergence zones which are them-
selves neither modal nor analogical. The areas which instantiate perceptual states as well as 
perceptual re-enactments in the sense of perceptual symbols are  feature maps which do not 
record but only simulate perceptual symbols with the simulation instructions coming from the 
convergence zones. It is perfectly legitimate to talk of perceptual symbols as derived records 
which depend in their being records on a convergence zone, but this seems to me to be an 
unnecessary move which only diminishes clarity.  A further point of clarification is in order 
which  is  not  tota lly  unrelated  to  the one  above.  Perceptu al  symbols  are  schematic  re-
enactments which do not re-enact or simulate by themselves. This is done by the higher order 
structures.  
It is interesting to see what Barsalou says about perceptual symbols in comparison to images: 
―Perceptual symbols are not like physical pictures; nor are they mental images or any other 
conscious form of conscious subjective experience‖ (Barsalou 1999, p. 582). This is supposed 
to be an assertion about the vehicles underlying thought. They are not picture like or anything 
resembling images but they are biological structures in the brain. Nonetheless these are the 
implementation parts of mechanisms that give rise to conceptual processes that are with re-
gard to functional description very near to mental imagery (cf. Kosslyn et al. 2006) and best 
understood as exhibiting image- or picture-like properties at a functional level of analysis. 
Therefore the best suited and most intelligible explanation of conceptual phenomena will re-
cur to image-like talk which is totally consistent with and even endorsed by proponents of 
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mechanistic explanation and Heuristic Identity Theory
16. Nevertheless it is clear that there are 
no real images in someone‘s brain. 
These image-like entities, perceptual symbols, are at the functional level somehow best com-
parable to single instances of schematic images. They are re-enactments of perceptual states 
which only re-enact schematic aspects of images which means that they never are re-enacted 
as representing single individuals but only generic aspects of them. It is quite clear that this 
alone is no satisfactory account of the plethora of conceptual functions of higher thought. 
Therefore Barsalou argues for further structures, which systematically exploit the resources 
offered by perceptual symbols, in order to explain conceptual phenomena. This can be done 
with more emphasis on both neurological explanations and functional ones. I will advance 
here with a greater emphasis on the functional aspects as is in accord with the general concep-
tion of PSST as cited above. Nonetheless I will draw on the neurological record when it is 
necessary or helpful. 
Perceptual symbols alone won‘t do for conceptual function and more complex meaning phe-
nomena so it is necessary that they are organized in some higher order structure. This struc-
ture is a frame in PSS. According to Barsalou a frame should be conceived of as ―an inte-
grated system of perceptual symbols which is used to construct specific simulations of a cate-
gory‖ (Barsalou 1999, p. 590).
17 A frame is a kind of higher order integration structure. Many 
single perceptual symbols, which are about very similar things in the world by virtue of their 
structural feature similarities between percepts and perceptual symbols at the neuronal level 
and by virtue of imagery at a higher level, which is indeed determined through the statistics at 
the neuronal level, are integrated into a functional unit, the respective frame. Frames allow for 
architectural order within the representing of single categories and thereby allow at the struc-
tural level for the functional properties of concepts. 
It might be convenient to see frames as concepts but Barsalou believes that simulators are the 
functional equivalent to concepts. Simulators can be understood as a combination of frames 
and simulations. Simulations are depended on frames in the sense that they are processes 
which run on frames. Simulations are re-enactments of parts of feature maps and thereby re-
enact at least one perceptual symbol. The complexity of simulations varies in the sense that 
they can be relatively primitive re-enactments of simple category instances as well as rela-
tively complex simulations of schematic but nonetheless relatively concrete situations. It is 
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crucial to see that simulations are context bound in an environmental and in a neurodynamical 
sense (cf. Spivey 2007) and are thus never the same. In different situations I will simulate 
different frames according to the environmental context I am embedded in. If I am making a 
weekend trip to a zoo and watch the ice bears in their enclosure I will instantiate the respec-
tive perceptual symbols via a simulator that correspond to the respective perceptual scene plus 
those that may be elicited by the context. These may be for example cuddlesome baby bears 
which are cute and afford petting. The emotional reactions which are also part of the simula-
tor and brought in via convergence zones may be such as happiness, etc. However, if I en-
counter an ice bear in its natural habitat with no special preparation on my side, than this 
simulation might look very different from that in the zoo. Another important factor which 
makes every simulation a different one is that the brain is a complex dynamical system which 
is always in a specific state in a complex state space which partly defines the next state the 
cognitive system is in. This suggests that people will exhibit different simulations even in 
same environments because of the intrinsic complexity of the brain alone. This suggestion 
was behaviourally confirmed by Barsalou (1989, 1993) showing that people almost always 
list different features with regard to a concept over time. 
Now, frames are binding diverse perceptual symbols with the help of convergence zones. 
Convergence zones are themselves amodal. They are higher order structures which combine 
different feature maps (cf. Zeki 1993) from perceptual brain areas with cortical areas which 
are more of the associative kind (cf. Damasio 1989, Damasio et al. 2004, Simmons and Barsa-
lou  2003). They  also  construct  different  hierarchical  structures  among themselves so that 
there  are  convergence  zones  which  combine  visual  and  auditory  processing  areas,  which 
themselves are products of the hierarchical organization of feature maps, holistic convergence 
zones,  analytic convergence zones  and modality  convergence zones,  up to  cross-modality 
convergence  zones  (Simmons  and  Barsalou  2003,  p.  461).  Convergence  zones  form  new 
kinds of conceptual structures by combining feature maps from different modalities and lower 
level convergence zones. It should be nonetheless clear that these structures are not able to 
construct meaning on their own and that they cannot perform the vast array of conceptual 
tasks if those are depended on meaning. I cannot really argue for these points here, since I 
have not treated meaning so far, but I will show later on that meaning is conferred to percep-
tual symbols alone, which is a result of their image-like character and their special kind of 
organization. For now it will suffice to state that these structures utilize feature maps in nor-
mal modes of cognitive processing. They may also create emergent cognitive products but 
they are in that always constitutively dependent on perceptual symbols. 15 
 
Within the convergence zone architecture the above mentioned analytic and holistic conver-
gence zones deserve proper treatment. They are the mechanistic lower level counterparts of 
subclasses of the aforementioned simulators. What does this mean? Within simulators there 
are property simulators which fill in detail for diverse categories. So for example we may 
have at the moment as a cognitive system only a holistic perceptual symbol of e.g. a cola bot-
tle which corresponds somehow to a holistic convergence zone of the respective entity. This 
holistic perceptual symbol delineates the rough form of the bottle dependent on the richness 
of the perceptual symbols involved in the simulation where the richness of the perceptual 
symbols involved is normally a function of the mode of the perceptual encounters with cola 
bottles. Now let us turn to the filling-in. The property simulators which correspond in the 
above mentioned way to analytic convergence zones provide the cognitive system with more 
fine grained imagery regarding the cola bottle. For example, when I read about a cola bottle 
and thereby simulate a cola bottle more or less offline than I might for instance ―take special 
notice‖ of the red lid and the white emblem on red ground so characteristic for most cola bot-
tles. This special filling-in is provided by property simulators which are bound via analytic 
convergence zones to holistic ones and to many others maybe as well, depending on the re-
spective simulation in play. 
It is of highest importance to note something which is a matter of course for those familiar 
with cognitive science in general and the imagery debate in particular but which might not be 
as obvious for the rest. Images, pictures, mental animation, etc. need not to be conscious and 
non-schematic. Normally both won‘t be. I already mentioned the prevalent aspect of schema-
tism but because of its great importance for the rest of the Magisterarbeit I will expand on it 
here again. To suppose that images must be conscious is mixing up images brought about by 
perceptual states and to some part even those provided by mental imagery with the images 
that underlie cognition
18. And in this confabulation lurks a second misunderstanding regard-
ing schematic structure in PSS, mental imagery and the ones from sensory processing:  
―In addition, the picture metaphor wrongly implies that images are perceived much as pictures 
are perceived. Unlike pictures, images are preorganized into objects and properties of objects 
– which explains why when we forget part of an image, it is not a random part. It is not as if a 
corner is torn from a photographic picture in the head. For example, if our image of a room is 
incomplete, it is not missing half a sofa or half a lampshade. Rather, images seem to be organ-
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ized into meaningful parts, which in turn are remembered in terms of spatial relations among 
them‖ (Kosslyn et al. 2006) (my italics). 
This preorganization which is the talk of here can be somehow compared to the property 
simulators in PSS which combine to create schematic structure. 
Schematic structure and contextualized simulation give PSS its wide scope of applicability. 
The schematic at the functional level of explanation makes PSS able to instantiate conceptual 
functions. It might be helpful here to visualize that (Barsalou 1999, p. 593):  
    
This graphic elucidates how we can conceive of classic symbolic/conceptual functions within 
PSS due to schematic structure on a functional-static level of description using images. For 
example, the image exhibits above/under or left of/in the middle/right of relations as well as 
more nested structures in (D). It is clear that there are no images like that in the head but it is 
 17 
 
proper to conceive on a functional level of images for reasons of intelligibility as well as from 
evidence from neuroscience and behavioural studies.   
I hope this short introduction to PSST is sufficient to understand my application of it on clas-
sic philosophical problems in the rest of the Magisterarbeit. I will recur on more evidence 
from neurobiology and behavioural studies in the course of the text when it is needed to clar-
ify a point or if it makes a case for my project. Now I will go ahead and expand on the phi-
losophical position called Concept Empiricism. 
 
4. Simulation, Emulation and Neural Exploitation 
 
Here I would like to expand on some organizing principles and processes which are of pivotal 
importance for the EEC program. These are simulation, emulation and neuronal exploitation. 
Simulation is a relatively widely accepted organizing process of the brain (cf. Goldman 2006,  
Barsalou 2008b) which should in my opinion be seen as the most important one which might 
help to dethrone more classic core processes referred to in cognitive science. Emulation (cf. 
Wolpert et al. 1995, Grush 1998, 2004) however is not that widely accepted as an organizing 
principle but gains more and more currency in e.g. theories of motor control (cf. Jeannerod 
1995) or schizophrenia (cf. Blakemore and Frith 2004). The conception of neural exploitation 
is rooted in the idea of evolutionary exploitation like it is developed in Gould and Lewontin 
(1979) and is adapted with regard to higher cognition by Gallese and Lakoff (2005). As is 
correctly argued by Glenberg (2008) it seems that these conceptions fit nicely together and 
help in developing a powerful theory of higher cognition. 
 
4.1 Simulation 
 
We dealt already with the concept of simulation above; therefore I will concentrate here on 
the general importance of simulation for cognition. For reasons which will become clearer 
later, I would like to go without computation and information processing as organizing prin-
ciples of cognition. This however necessitates successors for the purpose of explaining cogni-
tion. In my opinion ―simulation‖ should stand at the forefront of this project. Simulation is 18 
 
with regard to cognition working at a much higher level and less wide in scope as e.g. infor-
mation processing, which should be seen as one of its advantages: It is not as inflationary or 
uninformative as information processing. Simulation is mute with regard to more underlying 
processes which are examined at a neurobiological level and which are explained mechanisti-
cally. It is therefore not epistemically daring at all as is e.g. the assumption that computation 
or information processing underlie cognition. Simulation is observed in a plethora of cogni-
tive processes be it in conceptual processing (cf. Barsalou 1999), motor cognition (cf. Jean-
nerod 1995, 2006), memory research (cf. Rubin 2006) and social cognition (cf. Decety and 
Grèzes 2006). The simulation hypothesis is not that daring since it rests upon the unproblem-
atic observation that special online processing areas in the brain are re-enacted in cases of e.g. 
offline situations or other online situations: e.g. perceptual systems are activated in conceptual 
processing and in memory retrieval; motor areas which  are activated during action are acti-
vated in case of action planning or motor imagery and e.g. areas dedicated to emotional or 
motor processing are activated in the course of observing actions of others. Because of this 
simulation is highly compatible with the idea of emulation and neural exploitation which to-
gether deliver elegant and parsimonious theories of cognition. 
 
4.2 Neural exploitation 
 
Neural exploitation can be seen as a subclass of an evolutionary organizing principle in which 
parsimony is writ large. The principle states that some processes are realized by structures 
which might be evolved for different purposes. E.g. concepts are based on structures which 
developed for e.g. better movement and coordination in such and such an environment. How-
ever, these structures might be relatively decoupable in processing from these circumstances 
because of e.g. a wider emergence base (as in the case of emulation) or intrinsic possibilities 
of decoupabllitiy which are exploited though they were not evolved for that purpose.    
This principle explains nicely why simulation is that pervasive and it also suggests simulation 
as a plausible candidate for the explanation of higher cognition. Here neural exploitation can 
be seen as a kind of evolutionary why-explanation that constrains how-explanations of cogni-
tion (cf. Cummins 2000) and which favours those explanations which are working according 
to it. It is clear that e.g. PSS is favoured by models of neural exploitation whereas explana-
tions which are less parsimonious drop out. 19 
 
Moreover, neural exploitation circumvents elegantly the problem encountered by all those 
theories which state that concepts have evolved for action but which have nonetheless to ex-
plain how concepts figure in offline thought or dreaming. This is no problem for theories 
which adhere to neural exploitation for the reasons mentioned already above. 
 
4.3 Emulation 
 
The idea of emulation is based on both neural exploitation and simulation and shows that 
simulation is not only restricted to offline thought but may be a pervasive feature of online 
intelligence too. The assumption that something like an emulator exists might be primarily 
based on the problem that feedback from motor action is too slow to guide normal action ef-
fectively. Therefore it is assumed that an efferent copy of an action intention is fed into an 
emulator which predicts the possible outcome of an action and gives thereby a faster feedback 
than proprioception and kinaesthesia could do (cf. Grush 2004). 
Taking the details of the exact implementation by the side, what is important here, is that we 
have a candidate structure for offline thought processes which evolved for mundane online 
thought, which might be, according to neural exploitation, be exploited for offline thought. 
The involvement of an emulator in perceptual processes is obvious if we consider the strong 
ties between action and perception and the overriding capability of perception over proprio-
ception and kinaesthesia (cf. Cole and Paillard 1995).
19 
   
5. Concept Empiricism 
 
Now I want to make the case for Concept Empiricism
20, the philosophical agenda based on 
grounded cognition and especially PSST.   PSST  is the backbone of Concept  Empiricism; 
nonetheless it is  amenable to any straight theory from grounded cognition  proper. Concept 
Empiricism is in my opinion a general  philosophical theory which may deal with a large 
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processes more complex than mere sensation and which is dependent on emulation. After this system has 
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amount of philosophical problems. However my conception of Concept Empiricism differs 
widely from that of its foremost proponent, Jesse Prinz (2002, 2005, Boroditsky and Prinz 
2008). In what follows I will delineate the main idea behind Concept Empiricism as I con-
ceive of it and then I will spell out its respective contribution to main philosophical topics like 
the ontology of mental entities, meaning and intentionality. 
First of all, some clarifications regarding the name. Prinz coined ―Concept Empiricism‖ espe-
cially with regard to his view that concepts are never innate: ―All (human) concepts are copies 
or combinations of copies of perceptual representations (Prinz 2002, p. 108). This strong anti-
nativism is not plausible for there is ample evidence that children exhibit conceptual capabili-
ties from birth on (Bloom 2000). A good example is the early possession of animate and non-
animate concepts (Molina et al. 2004). Furthermore, it is not necessary to state concept nativ-
ism in order to obtain concepts grounded in perception or what Prinz calls the  modality-
specificity hypothesis: ―Concepts are couched in representational codes that are specific to 
our  perceptual  system‖  (Prinz  2002,  p.  119).  Sometimes  it  could  seem  that  Prinz‘s  anti-
nativist stance might be suggested by Barsalou‘s definition of perceptual symbols via analogi-
cality, too: ―The structure of a perceptual symbol corresponds, at least somewhat, to the per-
ceptual state that produced it‖ (Barsalou 1999, p. 578). But it is relatively easy to accommo-
date this view in order to make it less anti-nativist. We can say that perceptual symbols are 
schematic re-enactments in feature maps. This is less committal to views regarding innateness 
because innate convergence zones can bring about perceptually grounded concepts nonethe-
less. So I use Concept Empiricism primarily to express the idea that concepts are grounded in 
perceptual systems. 
To be clear here: The overwhelming part of our conceptual repertoire will be not innate but 
acquired through experience in interaction with the world and this is a very important motiva-
tion for and assumption of any Concept Empiricist view. Still it is possible for any Concept 
Empiricist view, defined over grounding concepts in perception, to allow for innate concepts, 
for a bunch of them clearly seems to exist. 
So, as already anticipated, the paramount tenet of Concept Empiricism as I conceive of it is its 
commitment to the assumption that all conceptual thought and with it all higher thought is 
grounded in perception. But it is important to note that this is not tantamount to the suggestion 
that all vehicles of thought are modal or only that this would hold for conceptual or higher 
thought. This is according to Daniel Weiskopf (2007) the alleged claim of Concept Empiri-
cism or at least for that what he has dubbed Strong Global Empiricism (SGE). In my opinion 21 
 
this claim was not stated by anyone working in the field of grounded cognition so far and 
Barsalou, who is discussed together with Prinz by Weiskopf extensively, is very clear about 
this  point:  ―Although  mechanisms  outside  sensory  motor  systems  enter  into  conceptual 
knowledge, perceptual symbols always remain grounded in these systems. Complete trans-
ductions never occur whereby amodal representations that lie in associative areas totally re-
place modal representations (Barsalou 1999, p. 583). 
It is now clear that both anti-nativism and SGE are not well suited candidates for the Concept 
Empiricist‘s agenda. Hence let us come back to my favourite idea for defining Concept Em-
piricism. I should be more specific about which property of concepts I am interested in. It is 
their meaning carrying property. What I would like to argue for is that it is the first and fore-
most tenet of Concept Empiricism to assume that meaning is a kind of mental imagery. A 
much related statement comes from Gallese and Lakoff (2005, p. 2): ―[…] understanding is 
imagination, and that what you understand of a sentence in a context is the meaning of that 
sentence in that context.‖
21 Gallese and Lakoff state an important point here which I want to 
make clear from the beginning. Imagination, understanding and meaning are the same thing. 
But more on this in the chapter on meaning. For the moment it is enough to have a feel for 
what I call Concept Empiricism. 
But I believe there is a further motivation for naming this view Concept Empiricism for it 
entails a consequence which is epistemological in nature and regarding this aspect in accord 
with classic Empiricism. We are not forced to restrict the label ―cognitive‖ to only the proc-
esses which involve perceptual symbols or imagery. There are distinctive ways of cognitive 
processing which use language only and  which work by a kind of associative processing 
which is very similar to an idea of a usage based account to meaning. And though we are not 
forced to restrict our usage of the label ―cognitive‖ to these cases, we are nonetheless entitled 
to restrict labels like ―meaningful thought‖, ―deep processing‖, ―explanation‖ or ―understand-
ing‖ to them. This is so because thoughts which are merely associative in nature lack meaning 
and if they lack meaning they lack understanding and thoughts which we do not understand 
cannot be seen as for example justified thoughts which figure in explanations or descriptions, 
etc
22.   
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So what I am on at is that we get new criteria of understanding and knowing if we adhere to 
Concept Empiricism and those criteria are satisfied in a respective situation by a respective 
kind of mental imagery. According to this a parrot which is able to instantiate diverse imagin-
istic red episodes has  an understanding of RED
23 regardless of  what he can do verbally, 
whereas a human who utters sentences like ―the sun is red in the evening‖ or ―red is the col-
our of tomatoes‖ and the whole bunch of accepted red related utterances in a language does 
not understand what RED is if he cannot imagine red. Here the one who parrots is not the par-
rot. It might here be convenient to mention LSA or HAL (cf. Landauer und Dumais 1997; 
Burgess and Lund 1997), statistical language programmes, which are able to create and an-
swer sentences by means of the statistical patterns in which different words are embedded. 
Those programmes can perform linguistic feasts at an inferential level which is already now 
impressing. Sooner or later they might be able to pass something like a Turing Test. They are 
however relatively primitive machines which only extract patterns of regularity in patterns of 
contextual co-occurrences.   
Another important point regarding the nature of concepts involved in cognitive systems is that 
differently embodied conceptual systems will yield different ontologies. For example, as we 
will see later, it is quite conceivable that we get a totally new understanding of abstract enti-
ties if we reflect on the nature of perceptual symbols and their integration in different conver-
gence zones. What I propose here is anew a table turning manoeuvre. We should start by our 
understanding of neural concepts and apply this to abstract entities instead of using our vague 
ideas of abstract entities and apply them then to the examination of nature of concepts.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
This kind of understanding need not be given by mental imagery or conceptual processing but can proceed 
according to more superficial modes of processing. So for example I might be able to make mathematical 
proofs according to associative processing only or might pass some exam in philosophy by giving answers with 
regard to the functional role of the words only. For example: I might answer questions successfully because of 
the reliable co-instantiation of some words in some discourse or language game where a language game is no 
meaning defining entity as in Wittgenstein (1953) but as the name indicates best, a playing with words but not 
with concepts. In this case: On the question “why are mental states no neural states” I might answer that men-
tal states are functional states which are multirealizable or on the question “why psychology cannot explain 
meaning” I might reliably answer, that it cannot do so “because meaning is a semantic phenomenon and no 
psychological one and that Frege had seen this already”. I might have definitely no idea what this is supposed 
to mean and correspondingly lack any mental imagery whatsoever but can nonetheless pass the exam by 
means of playing some superficial language game. This version of understanding could eventually be described 
best as some procedure which is successful according to easily observable behavioural criteria whereas the 
understanding I am talking about and which is very similar to that of Gallese and Lakoff (2005) is primarily de-
fined over instantiating an episode of mental imagery and which is in the first place not to be thought of as 
normative as is the former case where normative is simply seen as public or at least accessible by public proce-
dures.  
23 I am not versed in that topic but I would suggest that a parrot does not instantiate RED as humans do at all 
because of its very different embodiment. Let this therefore be an in-principle-case. 23 
 
This should suffice to get a grasp of what Concept Empiricism as I conceive of means and 
how it will structure the further debate. Now I will start with a prolonged discussion of mean-
ing. 
 
5.1 What meaning is for? 
 
This question is of pivotal importance if we want to discuss meaning today. My suspicion is 
that meaning is often misconceptualized in that we talk of many alleged aspects of it but not 
about why it is important and in some sense causal for a cognitive agent in a so and so speci-
fied environment. Hence it seems to me that we have lost track of the phenomenon of mean-
ing.  
To visualize what I mean and what is an important assumption of the whole EEC program 
consider the following situation. You stand in a room and want something to drink, let us say 
a delightfully fresh cola. Now think of a usage based approach at meaning (cf. Wittgenstein 
1953). It is not really clear how the knowledge of the use of words gets you started. You seem 
to know the meaning of cola because you know the use of the word ―cola‖ in the language 
you speak or even in many languages you speak. You are a full blown member of your lan-
guage community or even of foreign language communities. But how does this allow you to 
stand up, get in the kitchen and grasp for the soft drink of your choice. What is the contribu-
tion of this knowledge of the usage of words to your actions? Nothing! Since how does this 
knowledge of a usage pattern does communicate with your motor system or with your percep-
tual system? How does it relate to your visuo-spatial map which provides you with knowledge 
of the location where your cola containing refrigerator stands? How was the salient knowl-
edge retrieved from memory that the cola stands in usually in your refrigerator? This is a bit 
unsatisfying if we consider that every part of our condition should have evolved for action or 
at least be implemented by processes that are evolved for some kind of action or other (cf. 
Clark 1997, Varela et al. 1991). This does not mean that we should look for an evolutionary 
psychology
24 approach at meaning; certainly not. One should be very clear about the explana-
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neering and evolutionary theory (cf. Barkow et al. 1992). This is an approach I reject wholesale for its methods 
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phenomena on expressions of genes in phenotypes is as problematic as the one to one mapping of naively 
individuated psychological phenomena on brain states by means of correlative data and without mechanistic 24 
 
tory status of evolutionary explanations with regard to the project encountered here. These 
explanations only constrain our mechanistic explanations of concepts and hence meaning in 
the sense of what is plausible and what is to some degree possible (cf. Cummins 2000). But 
this is very important notwithstanding and we can be sure that evolution did not select con-
cepts for the ―the space of reasons‖.    
Now a defender of a usage based account might counter that it is important to know how I can 
get my Cola but that this has nothing to do with meaning. Fair enough! But then, what is it 
that you can do with meaning? What is its causal role and where is its place in nature. And 
why do you call that x that you individuate via a usage based account ―meaning‖? You can 
say that the use of a word is that word‘s meaning but what can you do with this? An answer 
may be: communicating. But what exactly do you communicate and what is the function of 
communication? A plausible candidate for the function of communication is that you ex-
change the meaning of thoughts. But this is not what you do according to a usage based ac-
count unless you believe that thoughts are the same as natural language usage. But to commu-
nicate only the meanings of words by using them (maybe using them correctly) in the act of 
using them does not seem to make sense and this not only from an evolutionary point of view.  
My suspicion is that proponents of other theories of meaning do not fare better. What can be 
assumed is that other proponents are better suited for dealing with special domains within 
philosophy, namely for special versions of ontology and epistemology. Many accounts seem 
primarily motivated by enabling for special kinds of ontology or epistemology or to suffice 
the common practice in these areas of work. A very good example is here Jerry Fodor‘s the-
ory of content (cf. Fodor 1987, 1990a). Let us take a look at his suggestions regarding content 
specification. According to Fodor concepts receive their content by means of reliable causal 
covariance with a respective category, kind or individual. Now Fodor encounters the problem 
that the same concept qua mental entity may reliably causally covary not only with the entity 
it was originally supposed to do so but also with entities very similar to that. This seems for 
many proponents of that causal semantics view outrageous. But why? If concepts were for 
acting or something else, which is a plausible candidate for natural selection or at least ex-
ploitative systems, than it is no problem at all that the same concept is activated for things 
very similar. Maybe it might be problematic if those very similar entities are very salient in 
our environment and for example we need to decide between our most important foodstuffs, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
explanation. This objection holds for many philosophical projects in the philosophy of mind too. I will use evi-
dence from evolutionary biology in this text only in the constraining way Cummins (2000) speaks of. 25 
 
let us say some very nourishing mushroom, and its highly poisonous and similar looking rela-
tive
25. But we can see that this is not the problem Fodor and others have in mind besides the 
circumstance that the natural solution to that problem would more plausibly occur on the level 
of e.g. optic or haptic discriminative abilities in combination with something like PSS instead 
of that described by Fodor and colleagues. What they are in my opinion really worried about 
is that the same concept does not denote the same kind and that this is a kind of ontological 
imprecision in our thinking which would not accord well with strong realism. That this seems 
to be the worry here instead of the worry for adaptive action becomes apparent when we take 
a closer look at the proposals for solution which are in the running, which will be done in the 
chapter on intentionality. 
It is also important to note that this case of causal inefficacy is not comparable to that of men-
tal states with regard to supervenience and the related phenomenon of supervenient causation 
(cf. Kim 2005). Even if something like a supervenient mental state is not causal in the sense 
of ―getting things done‖ it is nonetheless clear that the physical state on which that mental 
state supervenes is in this sense causal. For example, imagine a functional explanation of 
someone getting his cola. Even if we specify the mental states involved here relatively classi-
cally and assume for the sake of the example that there is a clear cut supervenience relation 
established between the mental states qua functional states and the neurobiological states, it is 
clear that the functional analysis describes causally efficacious events in the sense of getting 
things done; in this case: get the cola. This is not the case for meaning as it is conceived of for 
example in the usage based approach. In this case we do not really know what meaning is for 
or in order to state it more directly, we do not know what we can do with meaning, besides 
allowing for entities which play a role in some philosopher‘s objectivist world view or what-
ever. 
It is in my opinion highly problematic that most analytic theories of meaning are not supposed 
to work for action, understanding, imagination, etc. As I will try to show in later paragraphs, 
they do not seem to work for even that what they may eventually be supposed to be or any-
thing else or they may describe important phenomena which do however not qualify for the 
name ―meaning‖ as in the case of mere linguistic processing as a cognitive heuristic (cf. Bar-
salou 2008b) or in the case of a usage based account which may be utilized in language learn-
ing or in the description of language in general (cf. Tomasello 2003). But now it might seem 
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to be in order to ask anew a question which is not asked that often. What does it mean to qual-
ify for the name ―meaning‖? Sure, you may say, what you conceive of as meaning is impor-
tant and interesting in many respects but it is not meaning, because meaning is this and that. 
The same may work the other way around for me when I state that what you are talking about 
is not meaning, because meaning is this and that. And eventually we might agree upon that 
this is only a terminological quarrel. And indeed, in some respect it is only a terminological 
quarrel but in many other respects it is not. 
What does justify the use of the word ―meaning‖ for what I am fostering here is that the 
mechanisms I present here explain understanding, interpretation, explanation, aboutness, ac-
tion, etc.
26 The here individuated concepts as vehicles of meaning and thought allow for new 
explanations in epistemology, ontology, theo ry of action, etc.  and accommodate, eliminate 
and widen the functional roles  fulfilled by earlier theories of meaning. This, surely, is to be 
shown on the pages to follow. Nonetheless, this does ultimately justify the use of the word 
―meaning‖ for that what follows.    
In recapitulating the aim of this chapter on ―what meaning is for‖ it should be clear that many 
of the assumptions made here are very important for starting a philosophical exploration of 
meaning. If I am not aware of what I really want to clarify and am just captured in the maze of 
philosophical tradition and therefore make only associative adjustments to what was proposed 
before I will surely end up in a muddle. The project of explaining meaning via psychological 
concepts as well as any other approach at meaning needs to start with a clarification of its 
foundational assumptions and conceptualizations. I am not suggesting that I did this here but I 
think it is a good start to begin with delineating the motivation, the explanatory scope, every-
day phenomena and functional equivalence classes between new and old theories in order to 
get a better grasp of the phenomena.  
 
5.2 Problem of Symbol Grounding 
 
One principle motivation for adapting a view of conceptual meaning that is grounded in im-
agery is the symbol grounding problem (cf. Harnad 1990, see also Searle 1980). The symbol 
grounding problem can be understood as a philosophical problem proper which is relatively 
independent from experimental evidence from science. Harnad and Searle both approach the 
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problem with the help of mundane thought experiments. With mundane thought experiments I 
mean that they do not leave in principle the order of biology or of physics as we know it.
27 
These thought experiments are in addition to it  heuristically motivated in that  they try to 
simulate one‘s own mechanisms in play with regard to the phenomena described.
28 
I will quote Harnad here at full length since this passage summarizes the symbol grounding 
problem well: 
―My own example of the symbol grounding problem has two versions, one difficult, and 
one, I think, impossible. The difficult version is: Suppose you had to learn Chinese as a 
second language and the only source of information you had was a Chinese/Chinese 
dictionary. The trip through the dictionary would amount to a merry-go-round, passing 
endlessly from one meaningless symbol or symbol-string (the definiens) to another (the 
definiendum), never coming to a halt on what anything meant. The only reason cryp-
tologists of ancient languages and secret codes seem to be able to successfully accom-
plish something very like this is that their efforts are grounded in a first language and in 
real world experience and knowledge. The second variant of the dictionary-go-round, 
however, goes far beyond the conceivable resources of cryptology: Suppose you had to 
learn Chinese as a first language and the only source of information you had was a Chi-
nese/Chinese dictionary! This is more like the actual task faced by a purely symbolic 
model of the mind: How can you ever get off the symbol/symbol merry-go-round? How 
is symbol meaning to be grounded in something other than just more meaningless sym-
bols? This is the symbol grounding problem‖ (Harnad 1990, p. 339-340). 
Harnad sees the central difficulty lying in learning a new language which one does not al-
ready master and this only with the help of a dictionary which explains words in this language 
merely with the help of other words from this language. This might first look like a problem 
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or physics and then state that it is nonetheless possible that those systems instantiate for instance special psy-
chological capacities because they have arbitrarily defined them this way previously (cf. Chalmers 1996). These 
thought experiments are in my opinion paradigmatic for the implausible entailments of classic semantic theo-
ries which expect pondering about possible states to be semantic phenomena conceived of as linguistic. Inte-
restingly these theories often need very metaphoric or psychological vocabulary as “grasp” in order to make 
their claims intelligible as in the case of “grasping” the “proposition.” 
It is clear that from a point of PSS these non-mundane thought experiments boil down to a schematic combina-
tion of quasi-perceptual states – for instance – schematic human + lack of schematic biological state x (image 
schema for negation (cf. Johnson 1987) + mental states (phenomenal ones)). That this should yield anything 
interesting about things in the world instead about our capacity for imagination is very doubtful.   
28 Another respect in which they differ from no n-mundane thought experiments. The letter depend more on 
predefined “intuition pumps” (cf. Dennett 1995) whereas the mundane ones try to invoke one’s own pheno-
menal capacities.  28 
 
on its own, independent from the discussion of meaning. And somehow it is, but as we will 
see, what is entailed by the assumptions made here is highly relevant for our discussion of 
concepts and meaning. An intuitive assumption is that the solitary words you had to learn are 
meaningless. I think this is an assumption everybody can be comfortable with and even if you 
should believe that the words qua printed dots possess meaning
29 by themselves, they do not 
posses meaning for you. To be clear here, I definitely do not think that these printed dots pos-
sess meaning at all. Only bio-psychological entities do that and words only in the moment of 
being processed by cognitive systems. I just want to open the base of tolerance for the arg u-
ment a bit here. If you than combine these meaningless units, in this case words,  you have 
nothing more than a large amount of meaningless units.  Nowhere meaning emerges willy-
nilly. It is important that this argument is stated against conceptual models from AI and ph i-
losophy of mind but not against classical theories of meaning. This is so because classic theo-
ries of meaning often suppose entities of a relatively exotic origin so that Harnad has surely 
no interest in dealing with them at all. But my discussion will try to  deal with those more 
classic theories as well. 
The argument really lives from the  circumstance that you take the thought experiment ser i-
ously. Try to imagine that you sit in front of a Chinese/Chinese dictionary or any language 
you are not in any respect faintly familiar with.  Now, even if you imagine that you can learn 
with tremendous effort any single entry in the dictionary and thereby learn a plenty of connec-
tions between words, it seems rather problematic to say that you know what these things 
mean. And this shows perfectly the relatively  intuitive sense of ―mean‖: You do not under-
stand what the words are about because you have no imagery of them. Now you might reply 
that aboutness might be a property or relation that can be brought about without imagery, only 
by means of causal covariance. But how do you understand causal covariance in that particu-
lar case? In order to understand for example ―nfanfsd‖, which means in our language ―tree‖, 
what relation of causal covariance is necessary to understand it? The most plausible candidate 
is causal covariance between the word and an image of a tree. And what else could it be? 
What is a non-imagery candidate for a structure, which is not at least mediated by the senses 
and the underlying neural  machinery, which causally covaries with the word and thereby 
yields meaning? 
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It might here be in order to make a qualification. Harnad suggests in his thought experiment 
that you cannot learn the language from the dictionary. This is a bit problematic for we should 
ask us what it means to have learned a language when it does not mean to master a language. 
A classic criteriological approach at language mastering might say that you master a language 
when you can communicate as proficient as any standard member of a language community. 
Another example might be to pass a test successfully. For example something like a Turing 
Test or rather more mundane, the Toefel Test. Statistical language programs like LSA are 
already able to pass the letter very successfully and those programs learn languages exactly 
the way Harnad does not consider it possible. And is it not possible to think of a person who 
lacks any functional sense organ and their respective brain areas and is nonetheless able to 
master our language perfectly
30. I believe we can make here  a point on Harnad‘s behalf. It 
seems most plausible to define language mastering as grasping the meanings of words - where 
the meaning of a word is some imagery structure, PSS, whatever - because if language is for 
communication it is most plausible to assume that language does not communicate its own 
pattern of use but meaningful thoughts by virtue of eliciting mental imagery in others. So we 
might say that neither LSA nor any alleged subject which does not have learned the meanings 
of words has any proficiency with regard to a special language. What LSA or some imagined 
subject might have learned in such a case is a pattern of use but nothing more. So we can 
grant Harnad the point that no one could ever have learned that way a language
31.  
It is clear that this problem  naturally extends to amodal accounts of mental concepts which 
are neatly structured analogically to language. The counterparts for the words  for example 
might be the following structures x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, …, xn. Classic GOFAI accounts of the 
meaning of mental concepts as well as famous philosophical attempts at those phenomena 
assume these arbitrary symbols. They do not carry meaning by means of their intrinsic struc-
ture but by virtue of the information they carry; which makes them arbitrary as words. They 
are also not grounded in perceptual systems, whatever this would mean within a GOFAI ap-
proach. They are certainly connected to sensory systems but the sensory systems normally 
have only the function of bringing them about or of helping in categorization. So in offline 
thought the meanings one possesses are totally represented by those arbitrary structures. Now 
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31 In my opinion no not-impaired human could ever learn a real natural language the way it is learned by LSA. It 
would be unbelievable difficult to memorize  subpersonally this huge amount of information which is neither 
relevant nor structured relative to a kind of mental imagery.  30 
 
assume that those symbols get meaning through functional role. Then the same objection can 
be raised as in the case of the learner of the natural language
32. 
But let us take now a closer look at the symbol grounding problem from the view of Searle‘s 
(1980) Chinese Room argument, which is a thought experiment, too. I give a short quote from 
Searle (1999) which properly summarizes the argument and is in that form taken because of 
its concise depiction from Cole (2004): 
―Imagine a native English speaker who knows no Chinese locked in a room full of 
boxes of Chinese symbols (a data base) together with a book of instructions for manipu-
lating the symbols (the program). Imagine that people outside the room send in other 
Chinese symbols which, unknown to the person in the room, are questions in Chinese 
(the input). And imagine that by following the instructions in the program the man in 
the room is able to pass out Chinese symbols which are correct answers to the questions 
(the output). The program enables the person in the room to pass the Turing Test for 
understanding Chinese but he does not understand a word of Chinese.‖ AND ―The point 
of the argument is this: if the man in the room does not understand Chinese on the basis 
of implementing the appropriate program for understanding Chinese then neither does 
any other digital computer solely on that basis because no computer, qua computer, has 
anything the man does not have.‖ 
Because of its high similarity to the example of Harnard‘s I will only summarize shortly what 
Searle wants to show here. Searle supposes that a computational system like the Chinese 
Room, which is with regard to the processes involved isomorphic to an idealized GOFAI 
computer system, is not able to understand semantically what the symbols it processes are 
about. It neither knows its inputs nor its outputs even though it passes the Turing Test. Searle 
believes that this system lacks meaningful processing because it lacks intentionality. It is also 
a kind of critique of functionalistic theories for we have dedicated input – output systems in-
volved as well as a well defined symbol manipulation processes but nonetheless anything 
similar to a human mind. 
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5.3 Mental imagery 
 
Because of giving an account to meaning in which a wide conception of mental imagery plays 
an important role it is necessary to concentrate on images and their status within Concept 
Empiricism. It might be helpful to compare my approach with that of Kosslyn et al. (2006) 
regarding depictive representations in order to clarify my position. As will be shown, my con-
ception of content and vehicle differs widely from that used by main proponents of mental 
imagery and their critics. 
What must me stated first and foremost is that mental images as we deal with here are not 
identical to those images or pictures which we encounter every day. These images out there 
are constructs of our brains and the physical properties they are made of whereas mental im-
ages can be products of the brain alone and have underlying features which allow for the per-
ception and imagination of pictures but are by themselves not comparable to images at all. A 
great deal of discussion in philosophy with regard to the mental imagery debate concentrated 
on the features which make mental imagery differ from images as we encounter them in daily 
in the world. After this was done it was inferred that there cannot be anything like mental im-
agery in the mind-brain since mental imagery is not comparable to images (cf. Dennett 1969). 
This however is a fallacy or an inference from false assumptions regarding the features of 
mental imagery defined ahead. This whole discussion is paradigmatic for the debate of repre-
sentation in general where it is often assumed that there is no principled difference between 
representations ―out there‖ and ―in the head‖. But this is a fatal flaw derived from an overly 
archaic understanding of cognition where the brain is considered to be a kind of functional 
bucket wherein representations like words are to be found.  
Before I compare my approach to that of Kosslyn et al. (2006) I will try to refute the most 
classic critiques of mental imagery and thereby try to clarify what mental images are: 
One classic critique is that of the homunculus (cf. Pylyshyn 2002). The homunculus objection 
is not only brought forth against mental imagery accounts but indeed against most accounts of 
cognition at least with regard to action planning. But let us discuss it here with regard to men-
tal imagery. The general idea is that something or someone has to perceive the products of 
mental imagery anew because of their perceptual nature,
33 as if a percept were an image on 
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the retina
34. I do not want to state the more specific arguments against homunculus objections 
here but a more general objection against the homunculus fallacy which brings down the more 
specific objections too. The whole problem seems to depend on a special conception of an 
agentive self which is nowhere found within the brain or classic GOFAI models. But if we 
embrace self-organization there does not seem to be a problem anymore for we are not co m-
mitted to a single locus of action planning or perceiving
35. 
Another classic critique of mental imagery stems from Wittgenstein (1953) and regards the 
ambiguity of mental imagery: 
―I see a picture; it represents an old man walking up a steep path leaning on a stick – 
How? Might it not have looked the same if he had been sliding downhill in that posi-
tion? Perhaps a Martian would describe the picture so. I do not need to explain why we 
do not describe it so.‖ (p. 54, n. 139 [b]). 
It is clear that this is a kind of confabulation of a mental process with an external representa-
tion like a picture which might indeed be ambiguous. But it is mental imagery in the form of 
dynamic mental animation (cf. Hegarty 2004) which is as dynamic as perception itself which 
makes a thought about all the possible varieties of that scenario determinate. What this exam-
ple maximally
36 shows is the insufficiency of pictures as a kind of means of communication. 
But this does not seem to be of interest for us. 
Wittgenstein‘s (1953) duck/rabbit figure can be treated the same way. You have a determinate 
pattern of activation in your brain with regard to the picture which determines the way you 
perceive it to a special time t. The ambiguity is in the external picture with regard to the way 
we interpret it perceptually. But this is no objection against mental imagery which is determi-
nate in every instance
37.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ting. This then shall normally construct an infinite regress argument because the homunculus needs a further 
homunculus within his head and so on and so forth.   
34 For a critique of this simplistic view of perception compare Zeki (1993). 
35 What certainly is abandoned by accepting self -organization is the classic single locus of con trol sometimes 
conceived of as the self. But if we accept that the self it individuated primarily by what we phenomenologically 
conceive of daily there is no need for eliminativism with regard to the self as a phenomenological phenomenon 
but only with regard to a Cartesian discrete self.  
36 Maximally, for it cannot be argued that language is always unambiguous. Indeed, in many cases it is most 
ambiguous. 
37 Determinate does not mean that there is always a clear interpretation of the world. Indeed, the construction 
of a percept is a statistical process which is much less stable as we might think of. However, if one subpersonal 
interpretation has made the race against other interpretations  – i.e. if it is the stronger attractor in a state 
space – this delivers a determinate outcome. 33 
 
Dennett (1969) proposed the famous argument from indeterminacy: 
―Consider the tiger and his stripes. I can dream, imagine or see a striped tiger, but must 
the tiger I experience have a particular number of stripes? If seeing or imagining is hav-
ing a mental image, the image of the tiger must – obeying the rules of images in general 
– reveal a definite number of stripes showing, and one should be able to pin this down 
with such questions as ―more than ten?‖, ―less than twenty?‖‖ (Dennett, 1969, p. 136). 
First of all, we can state in accordance with Leibniz that there are no images in the brain and 
there is no reason to believe that mental imagery must exhibit the same properties like images. 
But let us nonetheless concentrate on the argument. The different neurological features of 
perception and mental imagery give a hint regarding what Dennett has here in mind. Percep-
tion is more controlled by bottom-up processes because its neural implementation base has 
stronger connections to the retina whereas mental imagery has not and therefore vanishes 
much faster. Otherwise we would often have serious hallucinations (cf. Ganis et al. (2004)). 
This explains to some degree the problem we have in interpreting mental imagery. We have 
worse phenomenological access to mental imagery than to perception and it therefore seems 
to us that mental images are indeterminate. 
What I would like to stress here is that I conceive of mental imagery in a very wide way so 
that it encompasses PSS too. This means that it possess a dynamic, perception like nature, 
which is schematically constructed. Talk of mental images might be generally unfortunate but 
it might be that we are somehow confined to it by means of the working techniques which are 
used in academic circles. If we could utilize videos more often, eventually an academic cul-
ture would have emerged in which we would have talked of mental animation from the be-
ginning, instead of mental imagery because we do not deal with concrete, static representa-
tions here. What we have are dynamic and temporally extended structures.   
 
5.4 Kosslyn 
 
Eventually the most important insights into mental imagery stem from the work of Stephen 
Kosslyn. He conceives of depictive representations as the format underlying mental imagery 
whereas the content is the information conveyed by the format (Kosslyn et al. 2006). And 
here it is where the strongest differences between my approach and the common versions of 34 
 
mental imagery emerge. According to Kosslyn there are also propositional representations 
which can also carry information where information is content. Propositional and depictive 
representation differ in that what they make explicit and accessible. Here it is relatively clear 
where the approaches differ or what I am generally proposing respectively: 
It seems to me more plausible to draw different boundaries. Instead of format it might be bet-
ter to speak directly of the vehicles where vehicles are neurological structures
38. These neuro-
logical structures carry content which is mental imagery. Mental imagery is what emerges 
from the enactment and re-enactment of feature maps and has functional and phenomenologi-
cal properties related to precepts. Mental imagery is here thought of as the meaning of mental 
states and is not comparable to the attempts at mental imagery proposed by Kosslyn and ot h-
ers working in the field. It is important that this does not get confused. To be clear: what I am 
disputing is not the idea of a functional mental imagery which might be different from a con-
ceptual system in processing some cognitive task, like a mental map.  What I am disputing is 
the format/content distinction drawn there. I use the term mental imagery in this Magisterar-
beit for both: The special cognitive function (cf. Kosslyn 1994, Farah 2000, Finke 1990, Mar-
tin 2007, Mahon and Caramazza 2009) and a very important part of meaning
39. 
Mental imagery in the sense of meaning need not be conscious
40. In most cases it is not. This 
is definitely not a contradiction to the definition of mental imagery given here and eventually 
not even to that from more classic approaches, if we consider that nobody seems to have a 
problem with unconscious propositions controlling cognition.  
Because of dismissing information as a good candidate for content it might be fair to say here 
why I think so. If we accept my definition of meaning, which I give below, it is clear that any-
thing which has the same functional role as information boils down to quasi-perceptual mean-
ing. Information might be called an external entity which brings about, by being perceived, 
meaning or content in the quasi-perceptual sense, but not by being something more abstract. 
For example, the proposition the ―apple is green‖ and a picture of a green apple might be said 
to convey information that some apple is green but in order to be conceivable by a consumer 
system, this information better has to create a conscious percept or a kind of mental imagery 
which is presentational in nature.  
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are functionally similar to schematic image structures.  
39 In case of misunderstanding or confabulation I will mention the difference. 
40 But see my discussion on consciousness and meaning below. 35 
 
5.5 Meaning 
 
In the course of dealing with concepts and meaning I have become more and more aware of 
the circumstance that it might be fortunate to eventually get rid of the concept of meaning 
without sacrificing many of the core phenomena we might associate with it in everyday life. 
The problem with the concept MEANING is that it is claimed by too many different ap-
proaches in philosophy and the sciences as well as by stances in everyday life. What I intend 
here is that MEANING as well as many conceptualizations of it might correspond to an um-
brella term with an eventually contradicting structure. Therefore I am going to present here 
some theoretical entities which are in accordance with the theories so far dealt with and which 
intersect with some of the phenomena which were conceptualized in different areas of preoc-
cupation with which was dealt as MEANING. Some of those phenomena will be consistent 
with the considerations so far made in the course of the Magisterarbeit, while others will be 
discarded.    
The phenomenon which is naturally at the forefront with regard to meaning is understanding. 
Understanding is to be considered here not in a strict epistemic sense of the term, neither 
theoretically nor practically. With understanding I do not mean the comprehension of some-
thing by means of a well performed skill which is performed as instructed or the explanation 
of something in accordance with scientific methods which are seen as imperative. With un-
derstanding I mean minimally the subjective feel of having at least a weak mental image of 
something and maximally the existence of rich perceptual symbol systems as well as a pleth-
ora of motor imagery. This kind of understanding contains both forms of understanding of the 
epistemic kind mentioned above but is in marked contrast with those since it can be much 
simpler. In its weakest sense it can be seen as an interpretative attempt, whereas it can be re-
garded in its strongest form as a kind of full blown knowledge with indefinitely high epis-
temic status.  
This understanding is in my opinion only in a weak sense representational whereas it is pri-
marily presentational. To be more concrete, it need not be representational
41 at all, though it is 
it in most cases for sure. What I mean with that is this: This kind of understanding will be in 
the most cases about something in the world which we may take as a thing-in-itself. However, 
what gives us an understanding of this thing is totally internal to us, presented to us in a con-
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structive way by perceptual mechanisms. In consequence, what I propose here is a strictly 
internal conception of a part what is regularly called meaning. The meaning of UNICORN 
and correspondingly our understanding what a unicorn is or is supposed to be is probably a 
mental image or a re-enacted perceptual episode of something like a horse which has a horn 
on its forehead. This understanding is totally presentational without a representational com-
ponent. What brings in the representational component in the case of a concept like APPLE is 
intentionality which is a relation between a cognitive system and some concrete entity in the 
world. But intentionality is a component which is active only in concrete situations and brings 
about understanding only in a generative sense or allows for action only in cases were under-
standing is already established; but more on this later in the chapter on intentionality.  
What is important to grasp here is that meaning has the capacity to be about the world but that 
it is not a feature which explains its meaning; as in the case BOOK, BOOK is not individu-
ated as a book concept because it is about books. What makes a BOOK concept, what it is for 
a cognitive system, is the perceptual state which is presented to it. Phenomenologically speak-
ing, I understand what a book is by the books presented to me in perception. 
It seems to me clear that understanding of this kind is in our folk understanding of the world 
tied to meaning. Therefore, this kind of understanding, which is explainable through a theory 
like PSST, can be seen as intersecting with the ―vicious‖ umbrella term MEANING.  
I conceive of this kind of presentational understanding as that what should primarily be seen 
as meaning. This however poses a plenty of questions I would like to answer on the pages to 
come:  
It must be clarified, what conceptual meaning is supposed to be, if we conceive of meaning as 
a kind of perception-like presentation, where a presentation can be a concrete perceptual epi-
sode, an episode of mental imagery or animation which all depend constituently on feature 
maps. A preliminary answer to this question might look like that: Perception-like presentation 
is dependent on conscious attention, in the sense that only what is sensed under conscious 
attention is presented. If we are committed to PSST, then it follows for perception that during 
the perceptual action a simulator is build up or that the perceptual experience is integrated 
into an already existing simulator. This means that we can say that any perceptual experience 
leads to a kind of conceptual structure and that conceptual meaning is thereby established. In 
this sense every presentational mode leads to a concept and every meaning instantiated is 
conceptual.   37 
 
This qualification necessitates remarks on perception as well as perception-like states, atten-
tion and consciousness; but each in turn. Perception and perception-like states have many 
phenomenological, functional and neuronal properties in common which was already shown 
when we dealt with PSST. When we encounter perception and perception-like states we face 
at least two problems. How do we separate non-conceptual and meaningless mere sensual 
awareness from conceptual and meaningful full-blown perception and to which degree do 
perception and especially perception-like states dependent on consciousness? In order to dif-
ferentiate perception from sensation or sensual awareness it might be useful to take a look at 
functionality or attentional processing or top-down processing with regard to subjects of ex-
amination. To differentiate perception from sensation by means of functionality could look 
like  this:  Perception  occurs  at  a  conscious  level  if  a  sense  modality  is  utilized  for  the 
achievement  of a cognitive system‘s  goals  whereas  at  the unconscious level  functionality 
might yield the integration of sensory processes in subpersonal processes which have meta-
bolic or higher order functions which might be defined via e.g. survival at the most basic level 
or a more context specific task demand in the respective circumstances. 
Attention is a further process by means of which we can differentiate perception from sensa-
tion. If we allocate attention at the conscious or unconscious level on some internal or exter-
nal entity, we thereby not only sense something or are aware of it, but we have normally a 
rich percept of it, which is tied to conceptual processing. However, a further question looms 
large here: To what extent is attention present in the case of unconscious perceptual proc-
esses? In my opinion attention is there in conscious and unconscious perceptual processing. In 
the unconscious case attention is a functional and subpersonal process which might be defin-
able over allocation of cognitive recourses, as a noise filter, etc. E.g. the allocation process 
can be seen as the unconscious obverse of what we phenomenally experience when we con-
centrate on a mental episode or an entity in our vicinity consciously.  
At this stage it should be clear that what was said about perception counts also for perception-
like states with the distinction that we need not differentiate perception-like states from exter-
nal sensory processes but eventually from involuntary sensual awareness as in the case of 
involuntary daydreaming. I believe however that the distinction made for the former case does 
also apply to the latter one.  
Top-down-processing is an additional means with which we can separate perception from 
sensation – yet it might be a not that easily graspable distinction criterion because it only al-
lows for a gradual distinction. It should be clear that there is a large amount of bottom-up 38 
 
processing in the case of sensation too. But the grade of neural higher order resource alloca-
tion is in the case of perceptual processing much larger and might be integrated in an emula-
tor, whereas sensation alone has no access to that an higher order structure. It is moreover 
controversial  whether  the  top-down-processing  criterion  is  a  criterion  which  is  accessible 
phenomenologically or only function-neuronally which is however fortunately no problem we 
have to worry about here. 
As was already suggested above attention is a process with which we can differentiate percep-
tion from mere sensation. It is also in accord with PSST that attention is necessary and suffi-
cient for concepts. I already assumed that attention is a process which is possible uncon-
sciously. Therefore it must now be asked whether presentation is only dependent on percep-
tion and attention which might be given even unconsciously or whether it is also dependent 
on conscious experience. 
It is indeed problematic to conceive of presentation independent of conscious experience. But 
this seems to be a problem because it would be unsatisfying if such a pervasive phenomenon 
like understanding would be dependent on consciousness since such a plethora of cognitive 
processes works independent from consciousness.  There is indeed a partial answer to the 
problem which is motivated by the two-visual pathways hypothesis version of Milner and 
Goodale (2006) and the target conception of consciousness of Campbell (2004). If we inte-
grate the conception of meaning presented here as mainly constructed in the ventral stream 
and if we then assume that we consciously target aims of our actions by means of the ventral 
stream too, it might be possible to ascribe the role of understanding to the ventral stream and 
correspondingly to conscious experienced presentation alone whereas we ascribe to uncon-
scious visuomotor representations which are brought about in the dorsal stream the role of 
fine grained action execution. I.e. direct affordances are decoupled from concepts. But this 
seems to be problematic, too, unless we do not assume a further well-nigh conceptual system 
for visuomotor action which comprehends its own  repertoire of visuomotor action under-
standing. If this were true we had a much disintegrated knowledge system at the functional 
and neuronal level which seems very integrated at the phenomenological level, because the 
knowledge of actions would be primarily at an unconscious visuomotor level whereas the 
knowledge of things like it is presented to us at an conceptual level is consciously and percep-
tually given and that which we really experience in everyday life.    
This might be generally a very interesting position but I must confess that I am not versed 
enough to claim that it is true. Further, we might also push back part of the problem to another 39 
 
more simple level but it nonetheless remains partly existent since it is to be clarified what the 
structure of visuomotor understanding is and, what seems to be the real problem here, that 
which is only partly pushed back, how that understanding relates to consciousness. Things are 
even more complicated since it does not seem clear that we can cut that easy between con-
scious  presentation  and  unconscious  processing  systems.  Many  processes  at  the  non-
visuomotor level seem to be working unconsciously too. At the transition between uncon-
scious and conscious processing we see the core problem for the approach delivered here. 
How do we best conceive of the non-visuomotor higher cognitive processes which are not 
consciously experienced? This is one of the core problems of phenomenology (cf. Gallagher 
and Zahavi 2008). It is surely not sufficient to assume that both processes are the same, one of 
them just conscious while the other one isn‘t.  
However, eventually PSST delivers a satisfying answer to that problem which is couched in 
the functional properties of PSS, mental imagery or mental animation. If we were able to 
show convincingly and over a wide area of phenomena that unconscious higher mental action 
reverts at a very fine grained level
42 to the same functional structure as it does when it reverts 
to conceptual thinking like it is according to PSST than we would have a case for a presenta-
tional theory of meaning at an unconscious level. A further candidate for overcoming the con-
scious-unconscious divide is the neuronal structure which is also individuated to some respect 
functionally. Feature maps which allow together with the further  ―correlates of conscious-
ness‖ for a conscious presentational mode and which are the most primitive entities in PSST 
too might be especially apt as the function-structural candidates for an unconscious presenta-
tional mode. 
Similar  ideas  might  be  applicable  to  visuomotor  processes  and  conscious  motor  imagery 
which would allow for dealing with more mundane affordances too. And eventually Jean-
nerod (2006) has already done that. While we‘re already on affordances and eventually even 
on a presentational theory of affordances which might be delivered through a similar high 
level functional theory as PSST is one, it might be fortunate to mention here a further aspect 
of our umbrella term MEANING which is conceived in our everyday thinking as a skilful 
coping with the world and which is also part and parcel of the conception of meaning accord-
ing to the ecological theory of vision (cf. Gibson 1976) and its theoretical successors (cf. 
Glenberg 1997, Noë 2004, O‘Regan and Noë 2001) and which might also be very similar to 
the approach regarding action-oriented representations taken by Wheeler (2005). Especially 
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Glenberg (1997) states the preponderance of affordances and conceives of them as the mean-
ings of objects in a way I showed with the help of the chair example in the overview chapter. 
Now, I am somehow indifferent to the actual status of affordances. They are in my opinion 
definitely of utmost importance and higher thought like it is exhibited in PSST is certainly 
primarily subsuming affordances. But what I am not sure about is what functionally or neu-
ronally explains them best. Eventually a theory like PSST can do that job or we need a special 
theory which especially stresses the visuomotor nature of affordances which might deserve a 
special treatment (cf. Goodale and Milner 2004). What I want to show here is merely that it 
might be possible to account for that important an aspect of our mental nature by a phenome-
nolocially motivated functional theory like PSST or something very similar and eventually to 
even overcome the conscious-unconscious divide which is very pervasive with regard to af-
fordances too. Moreover, we have spotted a further candidate for unravelling MEANING. 
With regard to this we can consider affordances depending on further theoretical commit-
ments as an important subclass of UNDERSTANDING or as a more autonomous part. 
However, affordances should not be confined to visuomotor representations. They are also 
present at a higher cognitive level in the form of functions where functions are presented 
through e.g. mental animation with regard to structures which are salient to a cognitive system 
in a special circumstance.    
There is surely a plenty of other aspects which were in philosophy subsumed under MEAN-
ING. Possible candidates are truth-functions, use, reference, causal covariance, etc. Reference 
and causal covariance get a proper treatment at later stages of this Magisterarbeit. The use 
theory of meaning was ―treated‖ at some places before. I also won‘t deal with truth function-
ality for I am not versed in these theories. Nonetheless I would be surprised if especially a 
truth-functional theory would make a case against what I said here or would make assump-
tions which were less metaphysically daring then those made by its competitors
43, especially 
if we consider the role and status which might be  attributed to truth as would seem natural 
from the background of PSST. Therefore I confine my considerations regarding meaning here 
to understanding and affordances. 
It should again be noted that what qualifies understanding and affo rdances as the primary 
heirs of meaning is the rich role both play in our inner cognitive lives as well as in our e n-
counters with the world. Both are metaphysically unpretentious for they both are brought 
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about by neuronal structures which exist indisputably. Both are in accord with the empirical 
record as I will again show shortly.  
 
5.5.1 Meaning internalism 
 
Additionally I will make some remarks concerning the internalism-externalism debate which 
has a rich philosophical history and which is of pivotal importance in many debates (cf. Put-
nam 1975, Burge 1979). What I am proposing here is a strict meaning internalism. Affor-
dance theorists are normally stating the total opposite of this and remarks on that topic from 
the side of theoreticians which emphasize the embodied nature are at least equivocal
44. What 
is however important – independent from philosophical preferences and fashions – is that af-
fordances and those structures underlying understanding are meaningful in the presentational 
sense, which I described above, especially in cases of strong offline thought in the manner of 
e.g. dreaming. Therefore I absolutely see no reason for en vogue statements of the kind we 
encounter in the meanwhile daily in the respective literature, like, e.g. it is clear that mean-
ing/thought is a unbelievably complex structure which comprises brain, body and environ-
ment
45. In opposition to these views I stress the  overwhelming role of the brain in meaning 
generation which justifies speaking of meaning as internal. It is clear that meaning is also de-
pendent on a body which carries and nourishes the brain, while this body is in turn dependent 
on an environment and that in turn is dependent on gravity and so forth. But in order  to give 
an interesting explanation and categorization of meaning it might be favorable to treat the 
brain as an open system that has many relations to the world (cf. Wilson 2002) which non e-
theless need not lead to this sort of infinite -regress-argument-externalism of which extended 
mind is one version (cf. Clark and Chalmers 1998). The argument that our brain is adapted to 
the shape and structure of our bodies (cf. Gallagher 2005) seems to be a non-starter too for the 
brain is indeed brought about by adapti ve evolution and mind-body interaction but a car is 
also brought about by a whole assembly line procedure, mechanics and machines and a 
process of ―evolutionary adaptation‖ brought about by market research, consumer attitude, 
governmental subsidies, etc. To function it must be ―nourished‖ with gas and oil and a car is 
indeed dependent on the ground on which it can stand and drive. But we have a very good 
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understanding of cars without making cars entities which span the car frame, engine, etc. and 
also comprise the mechanic which produced it, the road on which it can drive, the factory in 
which it was produced, the factory in which the robot was produced which in turn produced 
the car, the field in China from where the claim stems out of which the bricks were produced 
which are partly constituting the factory in which the robot which produced the car was pro-
duced, etc. Also, the assumption that meaning is primarily internal is not in opposition to the 
claim that meaning evolved for action or is based on mechanisms which evolved for action. 
This is totally compatible with the assumption that the whole action of which meaning is a 
part is interactionist and has thereby external and internal parts of which meaning is an inter-
nal one.   
 
5.5.2 Some empirical evidence 
 
But let us now take a closer look on the other reasons for conceiving of meaning in terms of 
mental imagery and related structures. Structural reasons which dictate to do so are that there 
is no evidence for language like structures in the brain whereas there are many modal struc-
tures which fit well with higher level explanations (cf. Barsalou 1999). There is also ample 
evidence from the literature on brain impairment that people who suffer damage to especially 
dedicated brain structures are not able to grasp the meaning of some entities
46. For example, 
concepts of living things like mammals are likely to be lost if damage occurs to visual areas 
of the brain whereas losing one‘s concepts of manipulable tools like pliers is increasingly 
probable in cases of damage to motor areas (cf. Warrington and Shallice 1984, Damasio and 
Damasio 1994, Humphreys and Forde 2001). There is further evidence from neuroimaging 
studies which suggests the modal nature of meaning: As is already suggested by the lesion 
studies above it is shown in neuroimaging studies that concepts which rely in behavioural 
tests as well as phenomenologically heavily on vision activate neural areas for vision whereas 
concepts which rely heavily on procedural or motor knowledge activate areas normally acti-
vated during motor cognition (cf. Martin et al. 1996). Further, colour concepts activate colour 
areas like V4 (cf. Chao and Martin 1999) and concepts which are about social relations and 
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interactions activate areas like the mirror neuron system or the prefrontal cortex (cf. Decety 
and Sommerville 2003, Gallese 2003). 
From the behavioural level there is evidence that many people perform as if they were ma-
nipulating imagery during cognitive operations which must be seen as involving meaning
47: 
For example, the size of an object during property verification tasks influences the time the 
participants of an experiment need to verify or falsify a property (Solomon and Barsalou 
2004), and gives a special perspective on an object in sentence comprehension tasks (Zwaan 
and Madden 2005). In general, imagery adapts the embodied perspective of the human agent 
(Zwaan and Madden 2005, Talmy 2000a, b) and this natural perspective influences often in a 
kind of feedback process the position of the respective parts of the eye: in case of thinking 
about clouds the eyes tend to look up whereas in the case of fl oor they tend to look down. 
Further, Wu and Barsalou (in press) observed occlusion effects in feature listing tasks. For 
example, ROLLED-UP LAWN produces properties such as ROOT or DIRT which are not 
normally listed in the case of LAWN and which are not to be expected from the composition-
ality of amodal language-like symbols. There are also perceptual shape effects to be seen in 
property verification tasks. Solomon and Barsalou (2001) found out that verifying MANE for 
HORSE yielded facilitation effects for MANE for PONY whereas it did not yield these e f-
fects for MANE for LION which speaks for the perceptual structure of the MANE concept 
involved because an amodal concept of MANE would not yield the exhibition of the effects 
described above on the behavioural level. In addition, modality switching phenomena which 
result in temporal cost or delay are also found in property verification tasks. So, processing in 
one modality is faster than processing across many modalities  and the switching between 
concepts in verification tasks which are related to different modalities tak e correspondingly 
longer (Pecher et al. 2003). Furthermore, there is evidence for an influence of movement 
comprehension in sentences on reaction times in  embodied evaluation of the correctness of 
sentences (Kaschak and Glenberg 2002). Very nice further examples are the semantic priming 
effects on behaviour which are observed in social psychology. For example, being primed on 
the main characters in stories   about hooligans, professors or elderly   people  respectively, 
yields that those, who are primed on these character types by listening to the story,  exhibit 
behaviour of the kind which is typical for the characters about which the stories are. People 
who were exposed to a story about elderly people will normally show signs of going slower, 
more stooped, etc. whereas people who heard the story about hooligans will exhibit signs of 
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more aggressive behaviour than usual (Bargh et al 1996, Dijksterhuis and Bargh 2001). There 
is an enormous range of other findings which show the pervasiveness of embodiment phe-
nomena for example with regard to the activation of musculature in thinking about sport ac-
tivities, dancing, playing piano, etc.  as well as the activation of emotional phenomena in 
thinking about emotions (Niedenthal et al. 2005).  
Let us now turn to the evidence for embodiment effects from cognitive linguistics. Here I 
draw especially on the metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson. Both argue convincingly for a 
strong metaphorical structuring of most concepts. E.g. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p.4) give an 
analysis of the argument-is-war-metaphor: 
Your claims are indefensible. 
He attacked every weak point in the argument. 
His criticisms were right on target. 
I demolished his argument. 
I‘ve never won an argument with him. 
You disagree. Okay, shoot! 
If you use that strategy, he‘ll wipe you out. 
He shot down all of my arguments. 
What is generally proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) is that a vast part of concepts 
is  structured  metaphorically  from  more  basic,  embodied  concepts  which  are  primarily 
grounded in the biomechanical engagement of the body with the world or diverse modality 
specific representations (see also Fauconnier and Turner (2002) for a somewhat different con-
ception). This break down of our concepts into metaphorical constructions was neurocompu-
tationally implemented in the KARMA model of Narayanan‘s (cf. Feldman and Narayanan 
2004) which modelled talk of international economies in terms of embodied action as well as 
health and well being.   
 
5.5.3 Implications of this view of meaning 
 
In the following paragraphs I am going to delineate shortly some of the implications and con-
sequences of the view of meaning developed above. 
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(a) Nonconceptual content 
 
Nonconceptual content does in the meanwhile play a very important role in the discussion of 
meaning and mental representation and so it is necessary to devote some remarks on it (cf. 
Bermudez 1998, 2003; Peacocke 1992; Tye 2005). A problem which is directly encountered 
is the distinction at the assumption‘s very heart; the distinction between nonconceptual and 
conceptual content. Everything on which we can concentrate by means of attention is concep-
tualizable according to PSST. Therefore there does not seem anything to be which can be 
granted to a nonconceptual content.   
(b) Classic semantic properties 
 
Those classic semantic properties like truth-functionality or reference do not play any longer 
any significant role in specifying meaning or belonging to meaning within Concept Empiri-
cism. Further, reference is according to my version of Concept Empiricism something that 
boils down to concrete intentionality which will be shown in the chapters on intentionality.  
 
(c) Dreams, daydreaming, offline-pondering 
 
Though it is surely true that concepts evolved for action, that they are primarily brought about 
by experience and that they are very often involved in situated conceptualizations it might be 
important to note that this is not the whole thing about concepts. It is somehow comprehensi-
ble that many researchers stress especially these features of concept research which were ne-
glected for a long time but it is dangerous and in my opinion plainly wrong to define concepts 
and with them meaning over situated action alone.  
There are indeed many situations in which concepts are processed relatively independent from 
the environment in which the respective cognizer is embedded, though they might nonetheless 
be brought about by interaction with it. Philosophical practice is a very good example for that. 
But not only philosophical practice is an example for that, there are indeed many mundane 
cases. You just need to go for a walk and suddenly think of your most beloved beverage, cola, 46 
 
without being thirsty, for example. There is no interesting environmental constraint in this 
case as well as in hundreds of other situations like that which we encounter every day.
48  
Other interesting cases involve fantasizing, dreaming, etc.  Our conceptual machinery is acti-
vated in all of these cases but at least in the case of dreaming some of our senses are not even 
reactive, far less active. 
 
 
(d) Affordances 
 
Meaning is often constituted by the mental imagery that allows for specific actions with re-
gard to special objects. The meaning of HAMMER is for most adult humans to a large part 
determined by the motor imagery involved in the normal use of hammers. ―Affordance‖ as it 
is used by Gibson (1979) however is much wider as the invocation of past experience only. It 
is first and foremost understood as the knowledge of the possibilities of action afforded by 
objects with regard to one‘s embodiment and one‘s position in space. It is relatively clear that 
a view of concepts like PSST delivers a structure which is highly compatible with affordance 
theory (cf. Glenberg 2008) or makes it even more plausible as in its original formulation 
which is in its commitment to direct perception in the strong sense more or less implausible.  
 
(e) Normativity and meaning 
 
If we adapt Concept Empiricism it seems rather awkward that meaning should be in any sense 
normative. And so it is. The idea that meaning is normative stems from a confabulation of 
language use and its aim of communication, which sets the norm, with meaning. Meanings by 
themselves are not at all constrained by norms and why should they be?  
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(f) Meaning and communication  
 
An often made objection against views of meaning which allow for a high degree of subjec-
tivity and privacy is that communication would not be possible at all. This is indeed an awk-
ward position. What indeed is supposed to be the aim of communication? And why should it 
always function for every kind of communicative purpose? For example, one aim of commu-
nication is the promotion of common action. With regard to mundane entities which we en-
counter every day there does not seem to be any problem if there is a large variety in mental 
imagery because of the high degree of similarity in perception of the things we regularly en-
counter in similar environments: Similar experiences lead to similar concepts.
49 But what 
about less mundane cases which depend much stronger on introspection and internal imagery 
generation as well as on complex events?  For example, what enables proper communication 
with regard to abstract thoughts like LOVE or JUSTICE?  
What seems peculiar to me is how and why anything like even a remote fit between concepts 
in different subjects should be brought about during communication especially with regard to 
abstract concepts.  In the case of concrete concepts communication often  succeeds because 
actions are what satisfy the communicative intent. In order to give me an apple your APPLE 
concept can be relatively far remote from mine  with regard to many features which are not 
relevant in the respective interacting context. In the case of  ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIP 
however where the concept structure is much more complex and maybe in some persons pri-
marily emerged from cultural narratives like novels or poetry
50 it is quite likely that your con-
cept might differ from that of someone else. Indeed this is what makes many relationships not 
that fortunate. 
What is so striking odd about the idea that communication needs the same or very similar 
concepts are the everyday encounters with friends and partners which often exhibit little 
match between one‘s own and other‘s concepts and often yield some kind of quarrel. Even 
more interesting is that point of view from a philosopher‘s standpoint if one considers the 
high degree of mismatch of positions even within the same paradigm. Another peculiar mis-
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apprehension behind this idea is the conception of evolution involved. Why should language 
be a perfect communication structure which enables perfect fit between the communicative 
intent of someone and the understanding of it in somebody else? From the standpoint of evo-
lution it is enough when communicative abilities are enhanced or made a little better with 
regard to the generation before. Language might be a very sophisticated means of communi-
cation if we compare it to the communicative means which are available for most animals. 
But so is bow and arrow with regard to predation. It is better than nothing but it also worse 
than a rifle. There is nothing perfect in evolution, only better or worse with regard to some 
environment and earlier generation. 
My point here is not that some philosophers denied the possibility of miscommunication but 
that they thought that successful communication needs a fit of concepts. Language is indeed 
never able to do this because it is infinitely poorer than the concepts which underlie it (cf. 
Zeki 1999) and concepts are not public
51 but private (contra Fodor (2004)).  
 
(g) Privacy of thought 
 
In the 20
th century, many philosophers pointed out the importance of the publicity of thought 
and meaning (cf. Wittgenstein 1953, Ryle 1949). From the point of view of the Concept Em-
piricist however it makes sense to stress the privacy of thought. The respective meanings are 
not the same in different subjects and they are not accessible to other subjects. There is no 
principled way of accessing the meaning of someone else‘s concepts.    
 
(h) The classical definitional view of concepts 
 
That concepts are not structured by means of necessary and sufficient conditions is now rather 
clear (cf. Murphy 2002). It is nonetheless interesting to consider why that many philosophers 
adhered to that thought that long. Anew it seems to me that we encounter here a usurpation of 
the theorizing about meaning by strong realist considerations with regard to objective knowl-
edge of the world. 
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Only if concepts are supposed to be realist representations of an objectively specifiable world 
it does make sense to speak of concepts as defined by virtue of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions. In any other case it does not seem very plausible to let definitions play a role with re-
gard to even classic conceptions of concepts (cf. Rosch and Mervis 1975).  
 
(i) Context sensitivity 
 
Explaining context sensitivity is no real problem for Concept Empiricism which is a great 
advantage for it over its competitors from philosophy of language and linguistics. Imagine for 
example a daily restaurant scene: You are ordering a hamburger at a diner (cf. Searle 1978). 
Now there are many problems arising if you belief that language or language-like structures 
do the cognitive work behind this order. It is relatively uninteresting here whether you are a 
proponent of literal meaning approaches or a contextualist. In both cases you are not able to 
explain how this is done if language is your model of thought and meaning. What the contex-
tualist can do and does is demonstrating the plethora of problems which arise in any situation 
by means of context for language approaches to meaning. In other words, he is describing an 
effect. What he cannot achieve is to explain how language can afford all that feats. Assuming 
that there is something like a background is indeed no explanation at all. It is only restating 
the problem. But let us now take a look at the plethora of problems I am speaking of: Suppose 
you are ordering at a diner by saying the following words to a waiter: ―I take a hamburger.‖ 
For example how do you or the waiter know how big the hamburger has to be? Is it 15 cm or 
5 meters in diameter? How do you or the waiter know when the burger shall be delivered? 
Now or in 4 days? Or may it happen, as Searle (1978) suggests, that it could follow that the 
burger is delivered, ―encased in a cubic yard of solid lucite plastic so rigid that it takes a jack 
hammer to open it‖ (p. 216). There are indefinitely many other cases. Take for example your 
desire to get in your house with the key to your front door. Language alone, even if it could 
mean something by itself, would nevertheless be that underdetermined that it would yield the 
most absurd actions. Eventually you would gain access to your house but not by opening the 
door with the key but by cutting a hole in a window by means of a sharp edge of the key. Or 
maybe you would try to dig a tunnel which leads into your basement using the key as a 
shovel. 50 
 
The problem is even much more complicated than it might seem on the first look. Especially 
contextualists try to answer these delicate questions with reference to some kind of relevance 
theory (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986). However this does not seem to work for any systems 
which work (compute) with language-like structures because those systems, mainly computa-
tional ones, are notoriously encountering the frame problem. It is indeed hard to conceive of a 
device which works with language-like entities and does not encounter the frame problem due 
to its structural properties 
The Concept Empiricist is in the fortunate circumstance that he can draw on PSST here as 
well as on DST
52 and complexity theory
53 naturally which allows for the explanation of con-
text sensitivity by means of biological relevance and  concrete mental imagery. Eventually 
however we should first distinguish between two versions of context sensitivity which are 
often confounded with each other. (1) Strong context sensitivity in the sense of long-ranging 
aims and the allocation of cognitive resources as well as the  control of perceptual inputs and 
motor outputs. (2) Weak context sensitivity in the sense of that which we are confronted with 
in the literal meaning – contextualism debate: The sheer endless interpretability of concepts 
which is due to the circumstance that classic concepts encode relatively few invariant fea-
tures. 
PSST alone answers (2). I‘m not that sure if it answers (1) without further specification. 
However, if it is embedded in a picture of the brain which abandons the computational meta-
phor and the related picture of the sense-represent-plan-move cycle (Wheeler 2005) like it is 
done when we adhere to ideas from complexity and dynamic systems theory in the sense of 
giving the brain a dynamic process ontology in which every brain state is constrained by the 
state space history of the previous brain states which are in causal vicinity (cf. Spivey 2007) 
as well from perceptual input which is determinate, but complex and itself constrained by the 
brains history, like in PSST, we can accommodate for (1) easily.    
 
(j) The phenomenological and ontological nature of language 
 
It might be objected that the assumption that language plays no important role in conceptual 
thought must be rejected on phenomenological grounds. Isn‘t the inner monologue a perva-
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sive phenomenon of our phenomenology? Yes it is, but if we ponder about that this might be 
a point for imagery and not for the classical view. For what is the phenomenological nature of 
language in these cases? It is dynamic auditory imagery which is comparable to other dy-
namic cognitive processes like mental animation. Let me cite here at some length a delicate 
passage from Spivey (2007) to get a grasp of what I mean: 
―Humor me now and say out loud, in an appropriately chiding manner, ―Spivey waxed 
philosophical.‖ That sentence took two or three seconds to say, and would probably take 
two or three seconds for a listener to understand. However, despite it clearly being an 
event stretched out in time, sentences are often treated as though they are static, whole 
things with no temporal properties whatsoever. Theoretical linguistics regularly draw 
static upside-down tree structures that illustrate the grammatical branching of the noun 
phrase and the verb phrase of such a sentence, and then the nested branching of the verb 
and adverb within the verb phrase. That kind of static illustration is typically intended to 
be an abstractly isomorphic proxy for a representation that a person has in their brain 
once they‘ve understood such a sentence. The meaning of the sentence is often treated 
similarly, as symbols in the head that are accessed and placed in some kind of attended 
processing arena that resembles all too much a Cartesian theatre [...] (p.204).‖ 
and, 
―While a person hears a sentence, it is obviously not the case that their brain is doing 
nothing until the sentence is finished and then it constructs some static representation. 
As the sentence is unfolding in time, the listener‘s brain is undergoing changes in its 
patterns of neural activation that are significantly driven by environmental auditory in-
put. If we describe these averaged firing rates of many neurons as locations in a neural 
state space, then the changes over time comprise a continuous trajectory through the 
state space. Thus, the understanding of a sentence is here conceived of as an event in the 
mind, not an object (p. 204).‖ 
This can be read not only as a piece of dynamic neurobiology but also as a phenomenology of 
sentence  comprehension and language processing more  general.  Language is  always  con-
ceived of dynamically as a process over time and never instantly as a whole.  
Language is phenomenologically properly perceived as related to a special modality with the 
related temporal phenomenology. Inner monologue, especially with regard to a language we 
are highly familiar with, is most often felt as auditory. The point is that language is never 52 
 
conceived of or perceived as language directly, whatever this is supposed to mean, but medi-
ated by at least one sense modality or its related mental imagery. Language isn‘t foundational 
but only accompanies thought and is therein dependent on mental imagery, i.e. it is the audi-
tory product of the same processes which allow for conceptual thought. The pervasive nature 
of inner monologue might therefore rather be best explained by e.g. the more or less function-
ally random activation of auditory language imagery which might be owned to strong neural 
connections with concepts which might itself be owned to the pivotal role of communication 
for our success of living. This seems natural if we consider the whole evidence for non-
linguistic processes marshalled here against propositional accounts of meaning and mental 
processing.      
 
(k) Abstract concepts – abstract meanings 
 
Even so you might admit that the meaning of concrete objects might be based on imagery you 
might be somehow sceptical how this might work for abstract concepts and their meanings 
(e.g. love, truth, university, etc.). It is indeed supposed that the understanding of abstract con-
cepts and their meanings works another way than that of more concrete concepts (Barsalou et 
al. 2005, Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings 2005). Nevertheless, nothing outside mental imagery 
gives rise to those meanings. What is different between concrete and abstract concepts is that 
abstract concepts are more dependent on the simulation of whole events and scenarios instead 
of single property simulations and that they involve more often introspection and emotion 
where emotion itself can be considered to be a kind of a sense modality (cf. James 1884, Prinz 
2004). So let us take as a first example LOVE. LOVE might involve special feelings which 
are involved in special acts and relations regarding other persons or objects. Also it might 
involve events like people kissing, sleeping with each other, making gifts, etc. LOVE also 
shows in a neat way how concepts and meanings change through developmental processes 
like sexual maturation and experience. Your concept of LOVE is quite different in all ages of 
your life, depending on your bodily fitness and wellbeing as well as on your grade of matura-
tion if we especially grant love with regard to mates a special role. As a child you might con-
ceive of LOVE primarily in terms of parental love or care for siblings or toys. In adolescence 
it might be that especially sexual arousal dominates your concept of LOVE whereas in a very 
high age or in cases of diseases like impotence your concept of LOVE might change tremen-
dously. You may also adapt a special version of LOVE by adhering to a cultural narrative 53 
 
from novels or television. The depicted events are imagined by you and might then be part of 
your concept LOVE.  
Another example might be UNIVERSITY (contra Ryle 1949). For someone who has never 
studied  at  a  university,  UNIVERSITY  might  be  a  concept  which  is  developed  relatively 
poorly. He might conceive of people in academic gowns, of refectories, of people reading 
books and lecturers giving talks. Someone however who studies or works at a university has a 
much richer concept of UNIVERSITY with a lot of imagery from different occasions.  
Now it might be objected that a university is an institution and that this institution might be a 
functional entity which is not the sum of its parts and so the concept of UNIVERSITY cannot 
be a collection of loose mental imagery. Therefore UNIVERSITY has to be about the func-
tional entity university
54. My answer here is that nobody knows or understands what this is 
supposed to mean nor why this should be the case. Besides the plenty of behavioural evidence 
which states that people conceive of abstract entities concretely and differently over time, it 
seems to me metaphysically and phenomenologically speaking wrong to adhere to that classic 
abstract entity talk. Not only is it very problematic to give a satisfactory account of abstract 
entities that is richer as the common practice to stat e a discrete word and confabulate it with 
the entity or the concept thereof, it is even more demanding to give an account of the relation 
between cognitive systems or vehicles of meaning and  ―abstract‖ entities in the world. And 
this account should better offer something more satisfying than the classic or naturalized ref-
erence relation because both seem more grounded in magical or platonic thinking than in a 
proper naturalistic worldview as I will argue in the chapters on intentionality. 
 
 
(l) The role of amodal connections and process structures for concepts and meaning  
 
The pivotal role of convergence zones in the structuring of concepts states the question if it is 
really that fortunate to assume that amodal structures play no role in meaning. Here we need 
to draw a concept – vehicle distinction as well as a distinction between phenomenological and 
structuro-functional individuation. 
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idea of an functional entity and the relations in which we can engage with it, not the idea of a functional con-
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As I mentioned in the introductory chapter of this Magisterarbeit Concept Empiricism is not 
committed to the vehicle – content distinction in the same way as its rivals. Nonetheless it is 
not only plausible but also necessary to draw the distinction in Concept Empiricism,  too, 
however with strongly differing assumptions regarding the distinction. 
It is plausible to draw the line between content and vehicle as the line between mental im-
agery which is also accessible to consciousness and the neurobiological mechanisms underly-
ing imagery. This is not that strong a distinction as that made classically (cf. Millikan 1993, 
Dennett 1991) because the mental imagery is totally determined through the structure of the 
neurobiological mechanisms which bring it about. In classical models the vehicles that carried 
the content did that arbitrarily and not by means of their structure but by means of e.g. no-
mological covariance or because of the circumstance that they are supposed to do so
55, etc.  
I believe we can now make the point that meaning is modal even when we accept the major 
role of convergence zones. Mental imagery is the product of the joint collaboration of feature 
maps and convergence zones. Feature maps are modal, convergence zones are amodal. Both 
together are the neurobiological vehicles of mental imagery.  Mental imagery is grounded in 
both but what makes it imagery in the first  place is the sensory  re-enactment in the feature 
maps
56.  
 
 
5.6 Concept Empiricism and intentionality – Action and experience 
 
Till now it might seem to some reader somehow disturbing that I advocate Concept Empiri-
cism as a model of subjective and somewhat solipsistic meaning. Wasn‘t exactly that consid-
ered as one of the most problematic assumptions of some of the most paradigmatic classical 
models? Yes and no, since what I have proposed here as subjective and solipsistic differs 
much from that what was proposed under that labels in the past (cf. Fodor 1980). But this is 
not important for now. What is important is that I believe that meaning is an internal structure 
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56 I confess that this distinction is a bit arbitrary. But this is not that problematic since I do not believe that that 
much depends on that distinction if we conceive of the amodal structures as convergence zones which are best 
described as structuring mental imagery according to principles which are functionally described in accordance 
with e.g. PSST and are therefore not linguistic. 55 
 
which is normally brought about by experience
57 and is very often utilized to enable action. 
However it should be clear to everyone that meaning is highly decoupleable from action and 
that it is also possible that new concepts are created through mechanisms  in the brain which 
lead to new emergent meanings
58. Further, I want to preclude the possibility of innate co n-
cepts neither. Therefore it seems to me best to make here a distinction between meaning on 
the one side as an internal structure and intentionality as a capacity
59 which allows for action 
and which brings about most concepts through sensual experience and is in this sense para-
digmatically external. 
To state it most easily, this chapter is about how the mind connects to the world and vice 
versa. I will delineate a model of intentionality
60 which is a combined approach  inspired by 
the architecture of PSS and deliberations from mechanistic philosophy of science.  PSST 
shows how we can conceive of intentionality whereas mechanistic models justify why PSST  
is better than its competitors
61. In the course of doing so I will draw attention  to models of 
intentionality and reference from philosophy of mind and language and try to show their 
weaknesses. 
First, intentionality is within Concept Empiricism to be seen as a kind of default position and 
nothing which must be brought in artificially by ad hoc assumptions in order to connect world 
and cognizer.  Intentionality emerges within Concept Empiricism fro m conceptual systems 
being grounded in sensorimotor ones. It seems to be that we can say frankly that the senses as 
well as our motor systems are the most direct way of contact with the world we can get.  So, 
every time we are encountering an entity we have  a concept or are building up a concept of 
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58 This new emergent meanings are also in some way driven by experience in that way that experience provides 
the concepts of which the new concept are made of but experience is not the driving process sour ce with re-
gard to the emergent structure in such cases.  
59 A capacity is an effect which is of primarily psychological nature (cf. Cummins 2000). 
60 I should note here that there is a further very interesting model of intentionality which conceives of intentio-
nality as a kind of conscious awareness towards objects the primary characteristic of which is directedness (cf. 
Freeman 1999, Newton 1996, Panksepp 2003). I am very sympathetic with this model and believe that it should 
be at the core of every understanding of intentionality. The boundaries of this Magisterarbeit are unfortunately 
very restricted and so I cannot discuss this model here. Nevertheless I would like to make a short statement 
here  which  tries  to  combine  motor  intentionality  and  the  sense  of  directedness. 
Research on schizophrenia shows strong connections between a loss of sense of agency with regard to bodily 
movement and with regard to thoughts (Frith 1992). The fact that thoughts lack a sense of agency isn’t suffi-
ciently explained in forward models which regard thoughts as classically representational (cf. Walter and Spitz-
er 2003). If however we conceive of thought as exhibiting felt directedness towards objects which might be 
planned by premotor cortex, etc. than we can explain with forward models how and why thoughts might lack a 
sense of agency in schizophrenia. This shows nicely how different fields of research might be fructified mutually 
within grounded cognition and how motor intentionally can figure large in thought.       
61 It also helps to clarify at a more abstract level the explanatory structure of e.g. PSST. In other words, it makes 
the implicit structure explicit. 56 
 
the entity encountered. And every time we want to act on the world we can do so by means of 
sensorimotor concepts which guide our actions towards the world. This is a simple conse-
quence of PSS and related systems in the brain. We can say that Concept Empiricism gets 
intentionality for free. 
What we get here is a model of intentionality that is elegantly emergentist in being explained 
by the structure of the body as well as the world. It therein differs strongly from classical ap-
proaches and it is here, as we will see, where one of its special philosophical strengths lies. To 
show this strength let me delineate why intentionality is that a big problem for classical ap-
proaches whereas it comes for free for Concept Empiricism. 
In classical approaches in cognitive science as well as in philosophy intentionality does not 
arise as  an  emergent  property  of the  entities and  activities
62  of the mechanisms involved 
alone. Suppose a cognitive system that is modelled according to the philosophical Representa-
tional Theory of Mind (RTM). To be clear here, there is no one RTM but many different ones 
which however share some core tenets which I will refer to here. Suppose that the system en-
countered is a conceptual system that is not grounded in sensorimotor systems but is a repre-
sentational system which is primarily a syntactical one in order to adhere to the computational 
metaphor of classical cognitivism as well as to philosophical (folk) belief -desire psychology 
modelled by language. With syntactical I mean here a system that has some established rules 
which are then applied on symbols. To get a grasp of that this system is able to do the follow-
ing by means of its structure: 
If g desires p 
And g beliefs that she needs to bring about q in order to get p 
Then g does q. 
Now the idea is here that these simple logical rules can be run computationally on brains and 
that they are what makes up a mind. But it is utterly unsatisfying that the symbols involved 
here do not possess meaning at all. Something is needed to give those symbols content and 
this is where theories of intentionality like causal semantics, informational semantics, tele o-
semantics, etc. come into play. 
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What is important to note here is that these theories are necessitated to make additional claims 
regarding intentionality and that intentionality does not seem to be entailed by a detailed de-
scription of the cognitive system alone. 
I want to discuss here Jesse Prinz‘s (2002) account of intentionality because Prinz tries to 
remedy the most problems encountered by his predecessors and so in discussing Prinz I will 
discuss the more classical approaches too. 
Prinz‘s version of the intentionality relation and intentional content looks as follows (2002, p. 
251): 
―X is the intentional content of C if 
IC1 Xs nomologically covary with tokens of C and 
IC2 an X was the incipient cause of C.‖ 
Prinz‘s talk of nomological covariance is a variant form of causal covariance which is within 
the project of naturalizing intentionality the most prominent assumption. IC2 is supposed to 
answer the disjunction problem where the disjunction problem is the problem that  within 
models of causal covariance a problem is encountered that stems from high degree similarity 
of encountered entities that deliver the respective intentional content, but more on that later. 
What seems for me problematic here are the following considerations: (1) Xs nomologically 
covarying with tokens of C is no actual but a dispositional property which cannot specify con-
tent in cases where X is not actually covarying, (2) the covariation relation is often not made 
clear, (3) it would be more plausible if intentionality were an emergent property, (4) IC1 does 
only seem to restate the general conception of intentionality and does not seem to explain it, 
(5) IC1 seems to be trivial and uninformative for causal covariation is too pervasive to be use-
ful for an explanation, (6) an intentionality theory should influence our metaphysics and epis-
temology and not the other way round, (7) IC1 is primarily a representation relation but no 
one for action, (8) IC2 is overly ad hoc and as bad an explanation as teleofunctions, (9) it is 
not clear why Prinz adheres to that model at all if we consider his commitment to PSST, (10) 
IC1 cannot explain how thoughts are meaningful in the absence of the entities they are sup-58 
 
posed to be about, (11) IC 1 has no serious conception of learning and (12) IC1 isn‘t able to 
account for abstract entities - meanings
63.       
(1) If we accept mechanistic explanations as the only acceptable ones from an epistemological 
as well as a metaphysical point of view we cannot allow for a lack of productive  continuity
64 
unless we are prepared to allow for meaning as only possible in cases of encounter with the 
thing it is about. It is also suspicious how that a version of content specification can handle 
the various forms of offline intelligence discussed above. 
(2) It is often not clear what the covariation relation is. What is needed to bring that relation 
about? In many examples which intentionality theorists give the relation is of perceptual na-
ture, particularly of visual nature. For example, the perceiving of  a horse instantiates the 
HORSE concept. But how does that happen? There is no theory of the mechanisms behind 
these processes delivered. Therefore classic intentionality theories are often no better off than 
stating that there is a point p (a symbol) which is somehow covarying with some other point s 
in the world (an entity)
65.  
(3) It also seems at least desirable if intentionality were a capacity which emerged from the 
parts and processes of the mental mechanisms involved together with the world instead of 
being  brought  in  by  further  more  or  less  causally  impotent  ―mechanisms‖
66. 
Causal/nomological covariance is indeed causally efficacious if the mechanisms involved are 
structurally able to relate to the world, as in the case of PSST or other approaches from 
grounded cognition. But in classical approaches causal covariance is often not sufficient and 
needs to be extended by subsidiary assumptions like the one that something is evolved to rep-
resent, incipient cause, etc. This does not allow for emergence from  a closed mechanism 
only
67. 
(4) In my opinion IC1 is only restating in more ge neral terms what is the problem of inten-
tionality instead of delivering an explanation of it. I am not saying that IC1 and the statement 
of the problem of intentionality are the same but that they are very similar.  Someone might 
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style of argumentation here. As you will easily see, a possible discussion of the conjunction of both principles 
does nothing to rebut my arguments and in proceeding the way I do I spare the reader much redundancy. 
64 See my chapter on mechanistic explanation for an understanding of what productive continuity is. 
65 This indeed seems to be the most abstract imagery which underlies idea of causal covariation. 
66 Indeed, what brings in intentionality isn’t a mechanism at all. I can hardly guess what is supposed to play the 
implementational – realizing role with regard to intentionality. 
67 The mechanism is closed with regard to explanation and some kinds of experience. It is howe ver an open 
system in the sense of Wilson (2002, p. 630) and in this sense open to the world.  59 
 
count it as an advantage of IC1 that it states the relation between world and mind in more 
general and eventually naturalistic terms but (1) I do not believe that this style of redescrip-
tion gets anything started and (2) that it is formulated too widely to be informative
68. Too 
many things stand in the relation depicted by IC1 and so it widens the relation in a way that is 
not conducive for any philosophical project. 
(5) IC1 is, as noted by many proponents of it themselves, somehow vulnerable to trivializ a-
tion arguments. The problem is that too many things stand in the relation expressed by IC1. 
For example, the moon is causally covariant with a special state of the tide  and the sun is 
causally covariant with some place of the earth illuminated at a special  time, as is the well 
being of my arm with its not being broken, etc. etc. Now you might believe that my function-
ing arm represents its well being or that the moon represents the tides but this is in my opinion 
not only awkward to believe, if you believe like me that something like the position of moon 
and tide depend on our neuronal ability to construct space and that the very ideas of moon and 
tide are dependent on our mental imagery, etc.  Therefore some theorists made an additional 
assumption which states that something that stands in an IC1 relation is only able to represent 
if it also evolved for doing so, if it were selected for that, etc. 
This seems to be a very unsatisfying argument. Compare it to other cases. For example you 
give an explanation of digestion. Now, instead of explaining digestion by a mechanistic e x-
planation – which means showing what it does combined and constrained mutually with giv-
ing an account of its structure – you say something about it that is that general that it has it in 
common with e.g. immune defence and respiration. In order then to let it differ from those 
processes you just state that it was not selected for the tasks carried out by immune defence or 
respiration because what it makes digestion is that it evolved for that. This is that bad an ex-
planation of digestion that nobody would ever dare to give it. Indeed, according to a naturalis-
tic reconstruction of what explanation is in the biological sciences it is not even an explana-
tion. I believe there is no reason to treat explanation in psychology or philosophy different 
and there is surely no reason to be satisfied with that an argument in philosophy too
69.    
                                                           
68 Indeed I believe that it is the most significant phenomenal characteristic of the whole intentionality debate 
that you have this uneasy feeling of not being informed in any interesting way from the outset you deal with it. 
69 It is clear that teleo-functionalists do not claim that they deliver full -fledged theories of mental representa-
tions and their contents. As Millikan (2004) writes:  “When the bare teleosemantic theory has been spent, the 
central task for a theory of intentional representation has not yet begun. Teleosemantic theories are piggyback 
theories. They must ride on more basic theories of representation, perhaps causal theories, or picture theories 
or informational theories, or some combination of these” (P. 66). But even if we conceive of teleo-functionalist 60 
 
(6) It might be somehow justified to proceed in ethics by stating traditional positions like 
―thou shall not kill‖ and then try to justify that position in a top-down manner with the ethical 
postulate up and psychology and anthropology down.
70 But this order seems devastating with 
regard to epistemology or metaphysics. For example, it is surely not essential  for anybody‘s 
wellbeing that something like ―metaphysical realism is true‖ must be defended on any ground 
by imposing a schema on our theories of perception or meaning in order to let this thesis 
come out true. 
In my opinion the order of procedure has to be turned upside-down. I believe that a theory of 
concepts is at the core of every other project in theoretical philosophy. It seems plausible that 
we start with a layout of our cognitive machinery and then develop a metaphysics and episte-
mology which corresponds to that machinery instead of defending metaphysical and episte-
mological positions which are a combination of antique anthropology and wishful thinking.  
But indeed the reverse is happening in much theoretical philosophy today which may indeed 
be the reason why many theoretical constructs today are not that far remote from antique 
ones, e.g. propositions and platonic forms seem to have terrifyingly much in common. It is 
very important to make that point because much of the debate in philosophy of mind and lan-
guage seems to be motivated by defending strong objectivism or realism or what have you. 
Indeed, I believe that concerns of metaphysics and epistemology are the core motivations for 
many assumptions in semantics which are never laid bare. 
However, I do not want to be understood wrong in this connection. Questions of realism, ob-
jectivity, knowledge, etc. are of utmost importance and interest and rightfully core disciplines 
of philosophy. Though I have to consider that it might be unbelievably more fruitful and 
above all more justified to build up metaphysics and epistemology from a theory of concepts, 
action, perception, etc. and not doing that in the reverse order. 
It might be helpful to get a grasp of what I am intending here by discussing one of the prob-
lems of the intentionality debate of high significance: the disjunction problem. It arises in 
cases in which different categories are disjunctively connected in a single content, that is to 
say  when  the  content  gets  disjunctive.  For  example,  imagine  you  walking  down  along  a 
meadow. Suddenly you see something in the great distance which instantiates a HORSE con-
cept in you, though it is nonetheless a cow and it does so regularly under great distance. But if 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
theories as piggy-back theories they are nonetheless unsatisfying for the reasons mentioned above. The addi-
tional qualifications which they make are to be criticized for the same reasons already mentioned.  
70 In fact, I do not believe that this is the right procedure. 61 
 
the thing, in this case the cow, causally covaries, as in this case, with your HORSE concept, 
your horse thought is about cows and at least a proponent of causal semantics is forced to 
modify his original definition of intentionality or so it seems. The solution Fodor chooses is 
the asymmetrical causal dependence assumption which roughly states that concept C which is 
reliably caused by b is nonetheless about c if b is in its bringing about C asymmetrically de-
pendent on c, i.e. when e.g. b brings about C only because of its similarity to c which is the 
―rightful‖ cause of C by means of e.g. incipient cause or proper function or what have you. 
The idea of a rightful cause is only seldom made explicit but seems in my opinion to be the 
core assumption behind all these problems and is a blend of normative epistemological and 
metaphysical thinking. 
Besides not being intelligible to me since this does not explain why something has to be about 
something else and not other and how it does that except with enlightened explanations of the 
kind that DOG relates to doginess, etc, it seems to be an ad hoc explanation which only tries 
to save a strong kind of realistic objectivism. There is absolutely no need for a concept to be 
about a special kind (whatever this is) in order to function properly. If your concept of aard-
vark is regularly instantiated in contact with boars than it is so. That this might be unfortunate 
in some circumstances is regrettable but so might be the circumstance that I cannot jump 5 km 
high in other ones. Making concepts finer grained is cognitive and epistemic work and is not 
coming and need not come for free. The function of concepts is not to allow for correct objec-
tive representation but to enable efficient action. 
The same is seen in the case of Jesse Prinz‘s (2002) solution to the disjunction problem. He 
makes assumption ―IC2 an X was the incipient cause of C‖ additionally to his nomological 
covariance assumption. But this is besides being causally inefficacious like Fodor‘s proposal 
also overly ad hoc and only plausible an assumption if one tries to incorporate with all means 
a realistic moment in one‘s theory.   
 (7) Even if it should be slightly imaginable that offline cognition might proceed by merely 
representing via intentional contents it is indeed difficult to do so for action. How do inten-
tional contents help in bringing about actions? This indeed is regularly perceived as the major 
flaw of classic theories and many philosophers believe that we need to augment our models to 
implement online thought. 
(8) IC2 is actually also an ad hoc explanation as for example a teleo-functionalist is one. But 
it seems to me even worse. If we have a structured or an unstructured representation at hand, 62 
 
how is something like an incipient cause specifying content? This problem is somehow simi-
lar to one which is encountered by a causal theory of naming (cf. Kripke 1972). An incipient 
cause, be it a first being brought about or a baptizing act, is causally inefficacious as long as it 
has no possibility of productive continuity within a mechanism. This is inter alia how causal-
historical explanations from evolutionary biology differ from those presented here by Prinz or 
Kripke. The former exhibit continuous productivity through genes whereas the latter do not 
exhibit it at all.
71 
(9) It is of great interest here that Jesse Prinz beliefs that intentional content is a  desideratum 
of every theory of concepts and that therefore his version of Concept Empiricism has in order 
to be a proper theory of concepts to exhibit precisely  this. But this is definitely at odds with 
his theory of concepts which is modelled according to PSST. For what is intentional content 
and how does it relate to something like a complex structural concept approach which can be 
seen as primarily motivated by grounding meaning in quasi -perceptual systems. What is it 
that intentional content does in this theory? I believe it is an eclectic move of Prinz and  an 
incoherent one in addition to it. 
It is precisely the quintessence of Concept Empiricism that we need not adhere to  causal se-
mantics in order to explain meaning as well as referential relations to the world.  This is done 
by a mapping of concepts with precepts as I will argue later.  Plausible reasons why Prinz 
might adhere to intentional content nonetheless are assumption about realism which he states 
at the beginning of his (2002) and a misconception of the revisionist potential of PSST as it is 
revealed in Boroditsky and Prinz (2008):  
There they make indeed a commitment to the essential quasi-perceptual nature of the content 
of our thoughts which also nicely states another advantage of PSS over language-like feature 
lists or summary representations: 
―But consider such feature lists a bit more closely. Imagine that you do not already 
know what ducks are and are told that ducks have feet, and a bill, and feathers, and can 
swim. How would you know that the feet on a duck were not like the feet inside your 
shoes, or the feet on a pig or a dog or a bathtub? If you do not already know what duck 
feet look like, simply knowing that ducks have feet would leave open infinite possibili-
ties. Surely ducks do not just have feet, they have duck feet. Further, how would you 
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know where on a duck the feet go? And how many feet? Beyond knowing that ducks 
have duck feet, you also need to know that they are in number appropriate for a duck 
and attached like on a duck. And clearly ducks do not just have feathers, they have duck 
feathers – relatively small and smooth and in a particular duck feather shape, attached 
like on a duck. And when ducks swim, they do not just swim, they swim like ducks 
swim. They do not do the backstroke, for example. What seemed like a sensible list of 
features turns out to be vacuous unless one already knows what ducks are like. Every 
feature in the list must be grounded in perceptual information that an individual already 
has about ducks, or else it would be useless‖ (Boroditsky and Prinz 2008, p. 100-101, 
italics theirs). 
and, 
―The perceptual details specific to duck feet and feathers and manners of motion are not 
simply extra information, they are the essential content or our knowledge that allows us 
to distinguish a duck from a Las Vegas show girl, for example, who also likely has feet 
and feathers and can swim‖ (Boroditsky and Prinz 2008, p. 101). 
This seems very reasonable if we consider PSST. But then both cite two
72 alleged limitations 
to sensorimotor grounding which indicate that the essence of PSST was not grasped by both 
of them: 
(a) Their first argument is that it is for some large categories hard to keep track of which are 
its members if they are spanned perceptually widely (e.g. category: vehicle; members:  car, 
hang glider). It seems clear what they are going for here. Car is probably a feature-technically 
typical member, whereas hang glider is not. What keeps the category together is function. 
Now let us first consider if this argument is anyway well deliberated. What I have not already 
stated may be some unfortunate confabulation in this argument of super ordinate concepts and 
categories. There is no reason to believe that a super -ordinate concept like VEHICLE repre-
sents a category in the world. Or is VEHICLE supposed to be a natural kind: ―For example, 
consider some super-ordinate level concepts, such as vehicle. [...] To keep track of the fact 
that these belong in the same category as cars, trucks and boats may be difficult when we are 
restricted to perceptual features alone‖ (p.104). It seems rather unfortunate to make a natural 
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kind of VEHICLE even if you are a realist. So it might be more appropriate to conceive of 
VEHICLE as a concept that is at least partly structured due to human interests.  
But this might not be that a serious deficit and merely owed to an unfortunate use of language. 
What is more serious a problem indeed is the point that PSST or alike should not be able to 
deal with functions. And how is language supposed to do that? Now suppose Boroditsky and 
Prinz might answer here that language does this by giving the concept a functional role, i.e. 
vehicles are things we drive with, vehicles are things we use for transportation, etc. But how 
makes language these sentences intelligible? This is exactly the problem we are talking about 
the whole time. What makes such sentences intelligible is the mental imagery underlying 
them. It is also mental animation which allows for an understanding of the meanings of the 
events in these sentences. Language does not explain anything here. It is only the phenome-
nological noise you cannot get rid of which often suggests the nominalistic feeling that words 
are the essences of things. 
Also, one of the most natural versions of the idea of function emerges from the affordances 
which are compound of your embodiment and your wishes to act on the environment. 
(b) Their second argument is, dependent on how you interpret it, somehow more compelling. 
It regards the processing costs of cognition and the fact that some concepts may depend on 
behavioural scripts which won‘t be retrieved any time you need to process the concept. 
On one side it might be correct here to give a role to language as I did already above, namely 
in cases of superficial processing. However it should be minded that meaning is nonetheless 
totally reserved for PSS and not for language. On the other side most concepts as they are 
conceived of in PSST are complex and there is no reason to believe that in many cases lan-
guage does play a role in conceptual processing. That this is possible and reflected in behav-
iour is one of the core ideas of PSST and properly expressed in context dependent or situ-
ational processing on the fly, i.e. that concepts are always instantiated by context specific 
online simulations in working memory. Another objection to Boroditsky and Prinz might be 
that the abstract concepts like DEMOCRACY, which they discuss, are in many people con-
ceptually less complex than most concrete concepts like APPLE. Further, assumptions about 
the brain‘s possibilities for conceptual processing, which are most often inspired by com-
puters (cf. Cherniak 1986) might be a bit adventurous if we mind the huge differences of 
computers and brains with regard to their working properties (cf. Edelman 1998). 65 
 
(10) A further problem, which Fodor (1990b) calls the ―really terrible problem‖, is that clas-
sical theories cannot explain thinking about things absent, if content is supposed to be neces-
sary for thinking, as it most often surely is. This is bitter, especially if we consider that even if 
classic theories are not supposed to handle cases of online intelligence, they are most often 
supposed to deal with offline intelligence relatively well (cf. Clark and Grush 1999, Wheeler 
2005). Why the problem emerges seems to be clear. If nothing is there to cause a concept as 
in the case of thought about absent things than there is no content in these cases and in this 
sense no thought whatsoever.  
(11) With this point could also have been dealt with in the chapter on meaning and under-
standing but I decided to discuss it here for it is especially nicely illustrated against the back-
ground of a causal theory of meaning or intentionality. Learning seems often to be a very de-
manding activity, as everybody might confirm from her own experience. It seems to be very 
tightly bound to understanding in the way I am talking about in the whole course of this Ma-
gisterarbeit. For example – I learn the whole evening about signal transmission in the brain 
and laborious hours later I have enhanced my understanding of neurotransmitters. I now con-
ceive of the process of signal transmission as little differently colored and shaped spheres 
which migrate over a cleft only in order to take in their place in a mould which is correspond-
ing to their shapes. If I am asked what a neurotransmitter is the first what comes to my mind 
is this – this is how I conceive of neurotransmitters and this is how I understand what a neuro-
transmitter  is.  When  I  encounter  some  complex  chemical  formula  in  an  essay  describing 
properties of neurotransmitters I can only make sense of it when I am also activating my dy-
namic imagery described above. Moreover, take an example from philosophy, e.g. reference: 
After a longer course of unconscious learning processes I ended up with an understanding of 
reference as some arrows emitting from something to a word or vice versa. 
But how do I learn according to a theory of meaning or intentionality which is primarily based 
on causal covariance. Especially, how am I able to learn something about neurotransmitters 
though I have never seen or heard a single neurotransmitter? Eventually I have a causal rela-
tion to the neurotransmitter which allows me to gain rich neurotransmitter meaning because 
the causal relation which is given in those who have seen them via a microscope was con-
veyed by those researchers to the ink which gives rise to the words and illustrations in my 
neurobiology textbook by means of an baptizing act of the kind ―Hereby I declare that you, 
ink, now bear causal relation so and so.‖ And when I am lucky enough that the causal relation 
wasn‘t  lost  during  transportation  to  the  book  store  or  was  accidentally  vacuumed  during 66 
 
cleaning my book shelf, it might have reached my brain via visual relations of an unspecified 
kind. 
Moreover, how does this approach account for the circumstance that we do not instantaneous-
ly learn by means of a correct causal covariance relation? For example – if I haven‘t unders-
tood what a gene is – supposed I could take a look at it – is this due to my inability to estab-
lish a causal covariation relation proper? Eventually we should educate children differently in 
school by buying better laser pointers for teachers so that they are able to teach more effec-
tively by allowing for finer grained causal covariance relations by means of better pointing.    
(12) Finally,  IC1 cannot explain how we  conceive of abstract entities
73. This is again an 
amusing conjuncture  because a point of critique which is very often marshaled against 
frameworks like Concept Empiricism is that they eventually might account for concrete ent i-
ties but that it is difficult to understand how they allow for understanding the meaning of ab-
stract entities. If we account for abstract entities in a way different from that proposed by me 
earlier the opposite of which would lead to a collapse of causal covariance theories anyway, 
than it is very hard to imagine how we establish causal covariance between a concept and an 
abstract entity – for an abstract entity is according to a more classic view never reducible to 
the sum of its parts (cf. Ryle 1949). To make this more graspable imagine how you might 
have a concept bearing the meaning UNIVERSITY according to a causal covariance view. 
What is the entity in this case to which you have a causal covariance relation? A special 
building on the campus? The bureau of the dean? It is obvious that causal covariance cannot 
account for abstract entities like they are normally conceived of.       
This list of 12 points can be certainly continued. I hope nonetheless that these 12 points alone 
have given a feel of the deficiency of the approaches which are commonly taken when philo-
sophers want to dealt with intentionality
74.  
 
5.6.1 Really naturalized intentionality for a non-magical world view   
 
Now it might be time to expand on my own conception of intentionality.  First and foremost I 
do not see the necessity to let concepts refer to categories in the world and thereby establish 
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conceptual meaning. It might be more in accordance with PSST to let meaning be constructed 
by the brain: 
―[…] categorization is embodied—given by our interactions, not just by objective prop-
erties of objects in the world, as a long philosophical tradition had assumed. Without us 
- without the way we sit and the way we form images - the wide range of objects we 
have called ―chairs‖ do not form a category. A simple sentence like ―Some chairs are 
green‖ is not true of the world independent of us, since there are neither chairs nor green 
things independent of us. It is, of course, true relative to our body-based understanding 
of the world. Our concepts must also be characterized relative to such a body-based un-
derstanding‖ (Gallese and Lakoff 2005, p. 12
). 
This is reflecting my remarks on the subjectivity of meaning made above. It is nonetheless 
clear that in many cases the concepts engage with things in the world. The world however 
does not intrinsically bear meaning or content in the form of categories. It is totally sufficient 
to assume out there is something like things-in-themselves.  
It is also important to specify the relation more properly with regard to internal processes. In 
classic approaches we often had a one way relation only. In Concept Empiricism this relation 
has at least three places at a coarse grained level of analysis. There is a relation between a 
concept and a percept and a percept and the world. 
To illustrate this imagine that you have attentional visual contact with the world at a specific 
prolonged moment in time. You are perceiving what is presented to you as a tree by the 
senses and the respective areas in the brain and which is also conceptualized as TREE because 
of previous contact with it. Now what makes your believe that there is a tree in front of you 
about that thing presented to you as a tree. It seems to be a mapping between the concept and 
the percept with respect to schematic aspects of the concept and the actual physical relation 
between your sensory system which bring about the percept and the thing which is presented 
to you perceptually. What we have here is a concrete version of intentionality which is conti-
nually productive because there are no parts of the whole system, which in that case encom-
passes your body and the world, which are not connected through continuous operations on 
them. 
This model without alteration also allows for handling truth. Your believe that there is a tree 
in front of you is true if what you have so and so conceptualized as TREE is presented to you 
by the senses in virtue of standing in front of you and if a mapping between the respective 68 
 
schematic features is successful. It is clear that this cannot be the entire story for what is also 
needed is a model of the representation of space and time. But this is unfortunately beyond 
my capacities here. It is nonetheless the case that the model above is within its confines a neat 
naturalistic approach at truth and truth-makers. Within this naturalistic framework we have 
plenty of truth-makers: For example ―the cat is on the mat‖ can be true if e.g. a specific spatial 
relation holds between the cat and the mat which is true with respect to e.g. an ego-centric 
spatial framework or if cat or mat are in respective ways corresponding to CAT or MAT via 
the percept cat or mat.  
My approach can be seen partly as a resemblance account to intentionality and truth. Partly 
because the relation does not pertain for a resemblance between something in the world and a 
concept but between a concept and a percept. As already mentioned, the relation between the 
percept and the things-in-themselves can be described in physical terms via the entities in-
volved like photons or sound waves, which ultimately grounds experience in the world, but 
this relation description has to be quietistic with regard to nature of the entities. It is clear that 
photons or sound waves are not natural kinds but what underlies them are of course things-in-
themselves too. But this is not important as long as we have a mode of description which 
shows that there are experimentally manipulable entities which engage in relations between 
cognitive systems and other entities. 
The concept and the percept resemble each other if they have some degree of fit between 
schematic features which are in both cases implemented in feature maps. Resemblance should 
here not be seen as reflected in deliberate and conscious estimates of resemblance but as a 
subpersonal processes which is determined by means of an in every case totally neuronally 
specified mapping process between the schematic feature map properties of an in a special 
instance related percept and concept and where the resemblance between the specific percept 
and concept is judged by neurological statistical processes only. This yields that resemblance 
is here seen as a cognitive process which is determinate through pattern mapping and which 
also gives a cognitive theory of resemblance. 
This makes this version of intentionality through resemblance not vulnerable to the most clas-
sic argument against resemblance theories of intentionality or representation: According to 
this  argument  resemblance  is  ubiquitous.  Everything  resembles  everything  (cf.  Goodman 
1954). For example, a sand corn in China resembles a polar bear in the Arctic in instantiating 
the property of sometimes being here and sometimes being there in an unspecified frame of 
time, etc, etc. This is according to my view of resemblance not the case. Resemblance as we 69 
 
need it for intentionality and most cognitive processing is a phenomenon at the subpersonal 
level totally determined in every case by means of a statistical mapping between a percept and 
a concept where the respective feature maps of both deliver the grade of statistical match. 
However it might be nonetheless useful to make here some comments on more classical ac-
counts to resemblance. If we concentrate on the sand corn – polar bear example it seems anew 
clear that resemblance is nothing in the world independent of cognitive agents. If we make a 
resemblance judgment which is at the personal level than we need mental imagery as well as 
representations of space and time in order to make it, since the individuation of salient fea-
tures in the world is dependent on the nervous system. Another cognitive agent with a differ-
ent brain would eventually have a perceptual system that would lead to a different individua-
tion where there were no sand corn but only something which we have no imagination of. 
Moreover, for the spatial representation of here and there we need a special spatial schema 
which  is  dependent  on  our  brain  too.  For  example  we  imagine  and  perceive  space  3-
dimensionally  because  the  structure  of  delta-neurons  sets  our  space  3-dimensionally  (cf. 
O‘Keefe 1993). So, even this deliberate and personal level resemblance judgment is depen-
dent on the structure of our cognitive system.  
It might now be objected that resemblance like I conceive of at the personal and the subper-
sonal level are different and that it might not be appropriate to count them as the same. On 
this however does not depend much. You might call that what I identified at the subpersonal 
level resemblance1 whereas that what is a encountered at the personal level resemblance2. 
Then I have developed a resemblance1 theory of intentionality here, but not a resemblance2 
theory. And when this resemblance1 theory of intentionality has not much in common with 
more classic resemblance2 theories of intentionality: Just as well! I do not make here a claim 
about words or historic succession. 
Another fact of importance is that the relation between the world and the mind delineated here 
is different from the classic reference relation in that it is a concrete relation which means that 
it obtains in cases of direct sensual contact only. There are no magical connections between 
mind and world of the kind that some thought bears a relation to the world in offline thinking 
let alone as dispositional thought. This entails that in cases where no direct contact exists be-
tween a specific object and the mind there is no intentionality. For example if I now ponder 
about Alpha Centauri and have no contact to visual contact to it by means of a telescope it 
does not make sense to say that my thoughts are in contact with it. There is no reference rela-
tion in this case between me or a thought of mine and Alpha Centauri. 70 
 
This is an important point which is especially directed against any theory which advocates 
classic semantic properties. What can it possibly mean that my thoughts are in contact with 
something in the world like it is presumed by those theories? How is this done? How is my 
WATER concept really about H2O though I have never heard anything about chemistry? 
What are the parts and processes which are productively continuous that allow for something 
like that a connection? Is there an arrow like relation between these things and from where 
does this arrow commence? And not less mysterious, how is it that something like water is 
actually semantically determined through H2O, a structure which is only intelligible from the 
background of model based and analogical reasoning developed in the natural sciences?  How 
is possible that this should help individuate my thoughts about water? Eventually by means of 
reference rays? 
 
5.6.2 Intensional Contexts 
 
Before I am going to discuss the ontology of mental states involved here I would like to dis-
cuss one especially notorious example from classic philosophy of language with regard to 
intentionality: That intentional sentences are intensional (cf. Chisholm 1957): 
For example: 
(1) X believes that Berlin is one of the largest cities in Germany. 
(2) X believes that the city in which the Brandenburger Tor stands is one of the largest cities 
in Germany. 
Both sentences are supposed to be intentional for both are expressing propositional attitudes, 
in this case ―I believe‖. The propositional content of both sentences is supposed to be influ-
enced by that circumstance for it is argued that without the propositional attitude both sen-
tences were interchangeable because both are coextensional
75. However, in the case of that 
intentional attitude both sentences are in an intensional context and are not interchangeable. 
The intension (cf. Carnap 1947) of both sentences is different and it  cannot be ascribed to X 
that he believes that both sentences have the same referent. 
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What I now want to argue for is that this conception is wrong. According to the Concept Em-
piricist understanding of intentionality there is nothing like a reference relation which objec-
tively is a property of a sentence or a proposition. It also does not seem to make sense to 
speak of sentences as if they could carry meaning or any other semantic property by them-
selves as is suggested by the idea delineated above. According to the conception of meaning 
as it is developed here it is only sensible to conceive of sentences if they are supposed to be 
meaningful as processed by the cognitive system and hence be intentional.  
For example, 
(3) Berlin is one of the largest cities in Germany. 
(4) The city in which the Brandenburger Tor stands is one of the largest cities in Germany. 
might be better conceived of as, 
(5) X knows that Berlin is one of the largest cities in Germany. 
(6) X knows that the city in which the Brandenburger Tor stands is one of the largest cities in 
Germany. 
Sentences are not ―co-intentional‖ or true by themselves but only with regard to a cognitive 
system that insanities them. In the case of (3) and (4) the interchangeability is due to the ab-
stract knowledge which is maybe related to social sources only. But the case of Berlin does 
not really fit with the idea of concrete intentionality as developed above. It might make sense 
to talk of ―co-intentionality‖ only in cases where concrete intentionality is possible like in: 
(7) X knows
76 that bananas are tasty. 
(8) X knows that the yellow fruit which is of crooked form is tasty. 
And even here it might be problematic to speak of real co-intentionality for what is here con-
verging are two descriptions in a language whereas the meanings behind the sentences are the 
same, e.g. in both cases an image of a banana . It might be useful to speak of something as 
exhibiting co-intentionality only where someone has strongly differing meanings that are not 
bound to one concept and where a relation of identity is only brought in play by abstract 
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model based reasoning like in the case of chemistry. In many other contexts the thing called 
coreferentiality is eventually more a social procedure of relating different linguistic labels. 
 
5.7 Concept Empiricism and the ontology of mental states 
 
Concept Empiricism can be seen as a claim about the ontology of mental states too. It is 
highly different from Functionalism in that it bounds contents to their vehicles and thereby 
grounds mental states in the sensorimotor systems of the brain. But it is also different from 
classic identity theory in that it does not merely state identities between mental states and sen-
sorimotor states. Concept Empiricism seems to fit nicely in the scheme of the heuristic iden-
tity theory and mechanistic explanations more generally. 
 
5.7.1 Mechanistic Explanations and Heuristic Identity Theory 
 
Mechanistic  explanation (cf.  Bechtel  2008, Craver 2007, Machamer et al.  2000, Wimsatt 
2006) as a model from philosophy of science together with the Heuristic Identity Theory (cf. 
Bechtel 2008, Bechtel and McCauley 1999) deliver a straightforward model of an ontology of 
mental states. As an ontological project it is justified by something like naturalistic recon-
struction (cf. Stich 1996) which considers those ontological commitments as justified which 
are derived from our best sciences. Before I am going to discuss both conceptions directly I 
will discuss multiple realizability at some length in order to resolve some of the doubts which 
might be entertained against a project of the kind delineated here. 
 
5.7.2 Arguments against multiple realizability 
 
Arguments from multiple realizability are classically seen as the strongest defenders and mo-
tivating principles of non-reductive materialism. Therefore it is necessary to hunt them down. 
This is everything else as a desperate endeavour as it might have been during the heyday of 
Functionalism. Many authors criticize multiple realizability relentlessly and as I will show 73 
 
with much cogency (cf. Polger 2004, Bickle 2003, Bechtel 2008, Bechtel and Mundale 1999, 
Shapiro 2004).  
To show the flawed reasoning behind multiple realizability assumptions it might be conven-
ient to demonstrate the shortcomings with regard to two classic example delivered by Fodor 
(1974) and Putnam (1967). 
Fodor tries to make a case for multiple realizability and therewith for Functionalism by dem-
onstrating  that  money  is  best  described  functionally  and  as  multiple  realizable  instead  of 
structurally, i.e. by means of the material realizers of money. This seems very reasonable be-
cause money is indeed dependent on different means like shells, bills, credit cards and what-
soever and it is surely more interesting to explain money by means of what you can do with it 
instead of explaining it with regard to what it is made of, e.g. shells. 
Putnam‘s argument is more relying on your sympathy for animals other than humans and their 
seemingly plausible functional susceptibility to pain. Putnam argues that it is chauvinistic to 
restrict ascriptions of pain to humans only and that it is most plausible to assume that other 
animals like birds or octopuses suffer pain too. 
Let us begin with Fodor‘s argument. Besides being initially intuitive it suffers from the cir-
cumstance that it ignores that money may get its function and meaning from human purposes 
and not by broader functional relations. What I mean with this is that money may not be re-
ducible to the means of payment but to concepts in people‘s brains. This is a general fact I 
deem plausible with regard to entities of social ontology (cf. Searle 1995). Money is only 
money because people make it to what it is and this is done by the meaning generating sys-
tems of individual humans. There is no collective mind which represents MONEY, but only 
individual minds which constitute money through similar conceptualization and respective 
action. 
Now, surely someone could object that especially these mental states which constitute money 
are functional states. But here kicks in a plethora of objections against this as well as the 
grade of plausibility you attribute to the previous considerations stemming from Concept Em-
piricism. Besides the mentioned evidence from grounded cognition there are points of critique 
which are especially responsive to the claims made about multiple realizability. The eventu-
ally strongest counterargument to multiple realizability is that which takes the grains of analy-
sis seriously (cf. Bechtel 2008, Bechtel and Mundale 1999): 74 
 
―[...] researchers have employed different grains of analysis in identifying psychological 
states and brain states, using a coarse grain to identify psychological states and a fine 
grain to differentiate brain states. Having invoked different grains, it is relatively easy to 
make a case for multiple realization. But if the grain size is kept constant, then the claim 
that psychological states are in fact multiply realized looks far less plausible. One can 
adapt either a coarse or a fine grain, but as long as one uses a comparable grain on both 
the brain and mind side, the mapping between them will be correspondingly systematic‖ 
(cf. Bechtel and Mundale 1999, p. 202). 
This can be exemplified in the case of the Fodor and Putnam examples respectively. Though I 
am inclined in the case of the Fodor example to ascribe the most interesting features of money 
to human psychology it is nonetheless interesting to apply the fineness of grain argument 
against Fodor‘s analysis of the means of payment. For it seems clear that when we refine the 
grain of argument that e.g. shells and e-cash respectively allow for very different kinds of 
economy. For example it does not seem plausible to belief that modern economy like it is in-
stantiated in stock trading would be possible if shells were the means of payment. Only e-cash 
seems to allow for the huge amounts of money to move easily between the continents in an 
appropriate time. What I want to say here is that the realizer matters much and has intrinsic 
structural properties which are not easily multiple realizable. 
This kind of argument can be brought force against Putnam too. At eventually the level of 
coarsest grain of analysis it might be plausible to see commonalities between the respective 
mental states like pain or hunger in humans, birds or octopuses. But at a finer grained level of 
analysis we see immediately massive differences between these animals even at the behav-
ioural level or at least it seems quite difficult to comprehend similarities between the pain 
behaviour of birds and humans, not to mention crocodiles or insects. What might allow for an 
ascription of pain states or events to other animals might be evolutionary considerations with 
regard to the function of pain in combination with studies of homologue structures in the 
nervous systems of the respective animals. 
A further problem might be to assume that mental states are discrete and the same over the 
course of time. Presumably no mental state or event is identical over time. Our ascriptions of 
mental states are made discrete by similarities among that mental states or events. But a neu-75 
 
rodynamic perspective suggests that there is nothing like an identical mental state or event 
over time even within a single cognitive system itself
77. 
Another important counterargument  is developed by Shaprio (2004). Shapiro delineates the 
massive biological constraints which make multiple realizability implausible an idea. He elu-
cidates this using the example of vision. For example, the topological organization of parts of 
the visual cortex is explained by Shaprio by the constraints which follow from early evol u-
tionary structures as well as from the laws of conductivity of cables which are applica ble to 
the neurons in the brain too. There is a plethora of further examples which show how specific 
modes of human vision are bound to the mechanisms that underlie it. Only if vision is ind i-
viduated most coarse grained then it happens that these specific features of human vision van-
ish. If we mind however the reports of impairments of vision as they are exhibited in hemine-
glect, simultan agnosia (cf. Robertson 2003), optic ataxia, etc. which reflect connections to 
action and other very special visual features in especially human vision as well, as do the spe-
cial impairments of blindsight (cf. Weiskrantz 1990) it seems more and more clear that higher 
level phenomena are massively constrained by what underlies them in very specific structural 
ways
78. 
Considerations regarding constraints are not as conclusive as the argument from finer grain 
because the former might not totally exclude the exhibition of some mental states to be very 
similar at the functional level though they might be realized  differently
79. But as Bechtel 
(2008) states:  
―Although  numerous  alternative  designs  may  be  possible  for  relatively  simple  ma-
chines, such as a corkscrew, when the machines get more complicated and the demands 
on how they function grow, the number of alternative designs seems to drop quickly. 
For example, a large number of highly inventive designs for manual typewriters were 
developed before settling on the one that became common by the first decades of the 
twentieth century. Even though some of these designs went into commercial production, 
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most exhibited performance shortcomings that led them to be discarded. There may 
simply not be as many workable designs as philosophers envisage from their armchairs‖ 
(p. 141).    
A further point which should be taken note of is that classic multiple realizability theorists 
restricted the functional analysis unjustifiable to the behavioural level which often led to a 
kind of tacit equation between behavioural and functional descriptions. There is however no 
reason for this special role of the behavioural level and the neglect of inner processes, might 
they be neuronal or hormonal or whatever. This seems to me to be a strong case against Func-
tionalism and multiple realizability which is somehow acknowledged in microfunctionalism 
(Clark 1989, 1993) which then yields in return a relaxation of the related content-vehicle dis-
tinction. 
 
5.7.3 Mechanistic explanation 
 
Let us now focus on mechanistic explanation. Though mechanistic explanation is originally a 
model of good
80 explanation in the biological and behavioural sciences it has also plenty of 
implications for the debate regarding the ontology of mental states  which are additionally 
very different from what is on offer traditionally: 
―Mechanistic explanation, in seeking to explain the behaviour of a mechanism in terms 
of the operations of its parts, is committed to a form of reduction. But mechanistic re-
duction, as I will argue in this chapter, is Janus-faced. As William Wimsatt (1976a) 
proposes, it is possible to be both a reductionist and an emergentist‖ (Bechtel 2008, p. 
129). 
It is now necessary to show what is meant with mechanistic explanation. First, the entities 
with which mechanistic explanations deal are not data, but phenomena, where phenomena are 
singular  or  repeatable  occurrences  in  the  world  (Bogen  and  Woodward  1988).  Second, 
mechanisms are composed of parts upon which, third, operations are performed: ―By parts I 
designate the structural components of a mechanism whereas by operations I refer to proc-
esses or changes involving the parts‖ (Bechtel 2008, p. 14). Fourth, the interplay between the 
operations is the organization of the system. In order to identify parts and operations it is nec-
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essary that mechanisms are decomposed structurally and functionally at different levels. This 
is how Bechtel (2008) conceives of mechanisms and mechanistic explanations. 
An  alternative  conceptualization  which  is  nevertheless  the  same  in  spirit  comes  from 
Machamer et al. (2000): ―Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are 
productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions‖ (p. 3). 
In this model entities are the vehicles of properties and activities the producers of change. It is 
stressed here from the very beginning that productive continuity is a feature which every good 
theory has to exhibit: 
―Complete descriptions of mechanisms exhibit productive continuity without gaps from 
the set up to termination conditions. Productive continuities are what make the connec-
tions  between  stages  intelligible.  If  a  mechanism  is  represented  schematically  by 
ABC, then the continuity lies in the arrows and their explication is in terms of the 
activities that the arrows represent. A missing arrow, namely, the inability to specify an 
activity,  leaves  an  explanatory  gap  in  the  productive  continuity  of  the  mechanism‖ 
(Machamer et al. 2000, p. 3).   
Conceptual systems as I conceive of in this Magisterarbeit are properly described as mecha-
nisms, indeed as very complicated mechanisms
81. Inter-level explanations, i.e. explanations 
which span different modes of explanation which are bound by a phenomenon of interest, are 
applied  to  PSS  and  related systems  which  helps  to  bring  functional -phenomenological-
behavioural explanations together with biological-structural ones. This indeed seems to be the 
core advantage of mechanistic explanations which brings us to the reductive or eliminative 
relations which are yielded by that kind of an approach. 
As Machamer, Darden and Craver write: 
―Theory change in neuroscience and molecular biology is most accurately characterized 
in terms of the gradual and piecemeal construction, evaluation and revision of multi-
level mechanism schemata...[...]...Elimination or replacement should be understood in 
terms of the reconceptualization or abandonment of the phenomenon to be explained, of 
a proposed mechanism schemata, or of its purported components. This contrasts with 
the static two-place relations between different theories (or levels) and with the case of 
logical deduction‖ (p. 23). 
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This is indeed very illuminating a passage. Mechanist explanations, in their being inter-level 
based, differ from classical approaches in that that they do not assume more or less unrelated 
theories at different levels whose vocabulary cannot be easily translated into one another. To 
the contrary, what they assume is that single phenomena are explained at different levels in-
stead of different levels individuating different phenomena; as Wimsatt (2006) states: ―Re-
ductive explanations are driven by referential identities [...] or localizations [...] – not by theo-
retical similarities‖ (p. 450), where those inter-level reductions are part of a single theory only 
[my emphasis].  Thereby the respective phenomena are in  ―piecemeal‖  fashion refined by 
bringing the different levels of explanation together. This is indeed highly compatible with the 
picture of meaning which was developed here. Property simulators which include biological 
models as well as behavioural ones of perceptually individuated phenomena  are mutually 
constraining each other in the course of a refinement of one‘s knowledge. Here the referential 
relations are set by the perceptual phenomenon via concrete or derived intentionality
82 and not 
by alleged semantic referential relations which individuate higher or lower level phenomena.  
It might be allowed to infer from this that elimination or reduction are everyday cognitive 
processes which are to be expected from dynamic knowledge structures like PSS. 
As the latter might indicate we can conceive of an ontology of mental states  as constructed 
around the phenomena of our perception
83. So the here proposed model states that mental en-
tities are complex multi-level mechanisms. For example, a perceptual state x is the parts, op-
erations and the organization among them  at a phenomenological, functional and structural 
level. This might not sound very parsimonious from an ontological point of view but it is in 
my opinion the best model we have  of mental states since it incorporates how we can ulti-
mately conceive of things-in-themselves against the background of our cognitive embod i-
ment. 
A question which is not that easily answered is, how we differ between mental states and non-
mental states. But this is a problem each account in the field has
84. This might be due to the 
circumstance that there is no real definition of cognition which is more informative than sta t-
ing that cognition is a combination of computation and information processing (cf. Adams 
and Aizawa 2008). Besides being uninformative this definition suffers from widening the 
scope of cognition to a lot of entities which we would normally not conceive of  as mental. 
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conceptual framework of phenomenology. 
84 Without eventually a Cartesianism regarding mental states which categorizes all phenomena which intuitiv e-
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Therefore it might be due to future research to give embodied definitions of cognition which 
might maybe primarily defined over perception, motor processes and mental imagery.  
But let us come back to our core concern: If we conceive of that as a model of reduction it 
might now be adequate to state how nonetheless emergence fits in this picture. If we conceive 
of emergence as Bechtel (2008) does we seem to have no problem at all: ―Emergence, as I use 
the term here, simply recognizes that whole systems exhibit behaviors that go beyond the be-
haviors of their parts‖ (p. 129). Or consider Wimsatt (2006) who conceives of emergence as 
the opposite of aggregativity where aggregativity can be seen as the classic claim that the 
whole is nothing more than the sum of its parts. This view of emergence is compatible with 
the reductionism proposed here and is exhibited in many complex systems as PSS. 
What is also important to know about mechanistic explanations is that they do not explain via 
laws. Indeed, this might be seen as a distinctive criterion of mechanistic explanations com-
pared to models used to explain the phenomena of interest for e.g. particle physics (cf. Cum-
mins 2000). Laws are within the vicinity of behavioural sciences more comparable to descrip-
tions of effects or capacities like the McGurk effect. They have a different explanatory status 
from that of mechanistic explanations in that they only state regularities like in the case of the 
McGurk effect, but they do not explain why it occurs. 
A few remarks are in order regarding the identities involved by the reductions made here. We 
can  conceive  of  them  as  heuristic  identities  according  to  Heuristic  Identity  Theory  (cf. 
McCauley and Bechtel 1999, Bechtel 2008). They are very different in spirit from the classic 
understanding of identity like it is proposed by Leibnitz as the following quote shows: 
―According to HIT, psycho-neural identities are not the conclusions of scientific re-
search but the premises. The logic behind their use looks to the converse of Leibniz‘s 
law. Instead of appealing to the identity of indiscernibles, this strategy exploits the in-
discernibility of identicals. What we learn about an entity or process under one descrip-
tion should apply to it under its other descriptions. Scientists do not advocate hypotheti-
cal identities because the two characterizations currently mirror one another perfectly. 
On the contrary, they advance them precisely because they do not!‖ (McCauley and 
Bechtel 1999, p. 753). 
The identity is here delivered by e.g. phenomena as points of fixation on which other descrip-
tions converge. The phenomena might be refined in this process and be therefore not stable 80 
 
points of fixation but be in flux. This is a dynamic which is reflected in the underlying con-
ceptual systems as well.  
 
5.7.4 Phenomenological considerations 
 
The account of the ontology of mental states delivered above is not without its problems. Its 
rightful commitment to phenomena might entail that we cannot really speak of an ontology of 
mental states anymore. And indeed, I am more and more convinced that it might be fruitful to 
secede from ontological commitments or at least from an ontology of mental states as we 
know them from the discussion in philosophy of mind. It might be that the project of an on-
tology of mental states is not compatible with the Concept Empiricist view developed here 
and its conception of understanding, since it seems clear that we cannot really understand e.g. 
the mind without a phenomenal, a functional and a structural perspective on it – this reflects 
properly  the  practice  in  the  sciences  which  ultimately  motivated  the  development  of  the 
mechanistic explanation framework. 
An ontology of mental states seems also committed – at least in its interesting sense – to a 
realist conception of meaning. Indeed, the whole considerations made regarding intentionality 
within the classic paradigm seem to justify a realist ontology and nothing else. However, as 
was shown, this picture does not seem to make sense. Understanding, as it was developed 
here, is necessarily multi-level and always phenomenological. A perceptual, non-referential 
theory of meaning does not seem to be compatible with a view that allows for a third-person 
―scientific‖ ontology which is made possible by transcending human embodied cognition by 
means of reference relations which are as scientific as the holy spirit and animism. Every sci-
entist and philosopher who takes embodiment seriously, is necessarily committed to a kind of 
antirealism or embodied realism which does not seem compatible with the project of a classic 
ontology if classic ontology is understood as the project of making assumptions about general 
entity classes and structures which are independent from human cognition, instead of a project 
like a neuro-ontology which is interested in how cognitive systems project an ontology or 
ontologies on the world (cf. Gallese and Metzinger 2003). 
How well does this fit with that what I said before on Functionalism, multiple realizability, 
mental states as mental mechanisms, the content-vehicle distinction, etc? I am not really clear 
about that point. This might primarily be owed to the circumstance that I came to adapt this 81 
 
position relatively recently, but be it as it may. What I would like to suggest is that we should 
interpret reversely the ontology of mental states debate in a way that makes it compatible with 
my phenomenological remarks. For instance, the content-vehicle distinction can be seen as an 
explanatory and not as an ontological commitment. If we adapt a computationalist perspective 
and know simultaneously not that much about brain function it might be totally legitimate to 
state that distinction from the background what we know first-personally about behaviour and 
about brains. However, if we have new insights from behavioural studies and know more 
about brain function we see a stronger connection between brain and behaviour at a more fine 
grained level like it is done in modern cognitive neuroscience
85. This picture has the advan-
tage that it is plausible from the phenomenal background of one‘s own learning and that it 
makes these distinctions more dependent on a flexible psychology instead of a rigid ontology. 
Therefore, if we use ―content‖ and ―vehicle‖ in order to designate different modes of presen-
tation regarding similar or same phenomena, then the distinction remains intelligible
86. 
The same goes for multiple realizability too. If we know not much about brain function and 
have an intellectual heritage which is rooted in an a nti-materialistic picture of the mind, it 
seems clear that we cannot connect many of our experiences in a coherent way. But, the more 
knowledge we acquire about brain function, i.e. the more sophisticated our mental imagery 
gets in correspondences to the phenomena we observe, the easier it is to connect the exper i-
ences. We are in none of the cases committed to a strong ontology but can at least partly inte-
grate many important conceptions within a phenomenological framework
87.    
     
5.8 Arguments against Concept Empiricism 
 
Here I want to discuss some of the arguments which were advanced against Concept Empiri-
cism and PSST. I will start this discussion with those arguments in mind which were directly 
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stantiated  synchronously. 
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at a less psychological level is that of e.g. words and the meaning which they carry. However, this is no fort u-
nate analogy for the explanation of meaning more generally, as we have seen in the course of the  Magisterar-
beit. 
87 I believe we should generally conceive of theories as psychological entities. If we do that it seems clear that 
many of the rigid distinctions which are often seen as ontological in nature are due to our psychological inabil i-
ty to connect different models or conceptual structures which we have stored in memory. This in reverse might 
be due to different causes. Eventually one is that the memory structures are too far remote stored in the struc-
tures which store them, whereas another might be a lack of socially accessible knowledge, etc.    82 
 
urged against Concept Empiricism in the way it was developed by Prinz and Barsalou. These 
arguments are collected in Machery (2007)
88. I will also discuss more indirect arguments from 
Fodor and Pylyshyn because of their classic status. 
 
5.8.1 Fodor and Pylyshyn 
 
Here I want to state some of  the classic points of critique of Fodor but also of Pylyshyn 
against non-propositional models of the mind. The most classic one is that which states that 
compositionality
89 is supposed to be the core architectural feature of any model of the mind. 
Less prominent but also of  interest for us is Fodor‘s argument how psychology has to look 
like if it wants to be taken seriously as a science. 
However, compositionality first: ―But, in fact, you need a further assumption, which we‘ll call 
the ‗principle of compositionality‘: insofar as a language is systematic, a lexical item must 
make approximately the same semantic contribution to each expression in which it occurs. It 
is, for example, only insofar as ―the‖, ―girl‖, ―loves‖ and ―John‖ make the same semantic con-
tribution to ―John loves the girl‖ that they make to ―the girl loves John‖ that understanding the 
one sentence implies understanding the other‖ (Fodor and Pylsyshyn 1988, p. 28 (internet 
draft)).
90  
                                                           
88 For related points of critique see Markman and Stilwell (2004). Another author who discusses the especially 
vehicular consequences of Concept Empiricism is Weiskopf (2007). Originally I planned to discuss Weiskopf’s 
critique of PSST here. However, due to the fact that Weiskopf strongly misconceives the assumptions made by 
PSST I finally deviated from that project. The problem with Weiskopf’s interpretation of PSST can be quickly 
summarized in the following four points: First, he conceives of concepts as primarily concerned with inference 
and categorization which omits the pivotal role of concepts for action. Second, he does seem to make the con-
tent-vehicle distinction in a way that is not really compatible with Concept Empiricism – his distinction between 
vehicle and content is so strong that there does not seem to be an influence of the vehicle on the content by 
means of the structure of the vehicle. Third, content is for Weiskopf intentional content which is to some part 
compatible with Prinz’s position but not with that of Barsalou when it is properly interpreted and even less 
with the whole consequences of PSST if they are properly clarified. Fourth, Weiskopf seems to differentiate 
percepts and concepts in that he says that if a percept comes under spontaneous control, then it is a concept. 
But this is surely not how percepts and concepts are distinguished within PSST. Concepts are functionally 
equivalent to simulators and those are very complex structures of which perceptual symbols are only a subpart. 
And even perceptual symbols are not the same as percepts because they are schematic in nature.   
89 I won’t discuss systematicity or productivity here for both do not seem to be worth a mention for an elabo-
rated theory of mind. Compositionality however is more of an interesting assumption, may it be only for the 
reason that it is discussed so pervasively. 
90 It is somehow opaque to me how Fodor can deal with semantic compositionality if we consider his position 
with regard  to intentionality. How are concepts which depend with regard to their semantic properties on 
causal covariance easily compositional? 83 
 
This quote from the locus classicus of the defence of language-like ―brick‖ compositionality 
is regarding the architecture of cognitive systems something like the holy grail of philosophi-
cal contributions to a GOFAI conception of the mind. However, there is no behavioural evi-
dence whatsoever for it as I argue with regard to the discussion of Machery below. Here I 
confine
91 myself to more phenomenological contemplations by Prinz and Clark (2004)  who 
consider compositionality to be one of the ―two dogmas of Fodorism‖
92. 
Prinz‘s and Clark‘s attack against Fodorism is levelled on the distinction between concept 
rationalism and concept pragmatism where concept rationalism confers to concepts the func-
tion of representing for higher intellectual pondering whatsoever whereas concept pragmatism 
stresses that the main function of concepts is to subserve action. Here is an example of what 
might follow from this according to Prinz and Clark (2004, p. 60): 
―Suppose concepts are collections of action-oriented abilities. Suppose they are struc-
tured representations of features that allow us to sort, draw inferences, and physically 
coordinate behavior with objects in the world. How do concepts of this kind hold up 
against Fodor‘s dilemma? They certainly do not qualify as definitions, so they are not 
likely to combine compositionally. Take the concept 50 POUND EGG. If asked to con-
sider such a monstrous entity, several features might come to mind. We might imagine 
that it is quite durable, in contrast to more familiar eggs, and we might imagine that it 
was laid by a huge creature, perhaps a dinosaur. Neither of these features, durability or 
being laid by a dinosaur, are plausible components of the concept EGG or the concept 
of WEIGHING 50 POUNDS. They emerge from background knowledge. Fodor thinks 
this is a problem. He thinks the only thing we really know about a 50 pound egg is that 
it is an egg and that it is 50 pounds. Adding extra information prevents concepts from 
combining in a way that will support systematicity and productivity.‖ 
I often find it difficult to discuss these topics without regard of empirical evidence but in this 
case it seems phenomenologically clear how we process a compound concept like 50 POUND 
EGG. From an evolutionary standpoint which may also be detached from direct behavioural 
evidence it does not seem to make sense to conceive of concepts the way Fodor does either. 
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It is in my opinion one of the most peculiar phenomena how much attention a position like 
that of Fodor received for such a long time if we consider its behavioural and phenomenol-
ogical implausibility though it must be admitted that Fodor might be, together with Stephen 
Stich (1983), the one who has spelled out the consequences of the premises from the GOFAI 
paradigm with most rigour and consistency. If we accept the propositional account how it 
might culminate in the Language of Thought Hypothesis (Fodor 1975) it might be compre-
hensible why there is that a great commitment to compositionality. It is a kind of necessity if 
we accept the core assumptions of that paradigm. However the paradigm does not seem to be 
substantiated by empirical evidence from psychology, neuroscience and those branches of 
linguistics which mind how people really perform.  
Another assumption of Fodor‘s is that psychology has, in order to be taken scientifically seri-
ously, to assume that concepts are atomistic. This were due to the circumstance that only at-
omistic concepts allow for law-like generalizations where those are the subject of any scien-
tific practice proper. 
In consequence, in order to adhere to a law of psychology
93 someone has to regularly behave 
in accord with folk-psychological generalizations and the concepts utilized in that schematic 
generalizations have to be identical over different instance s. This indeed seems to be pro b-
lematic for three reasons. First, if the world does not fit massively in a scientific explanation 
model it is awkward to claim that nonetheless the model has to apply in ord er to work scien-
tifically. Second, even if concepts were unstructured like Fodor proposes it would be highly 
improbable that someone would proceed the same way because of massive context pheno m-
ena like the residual cognitive system, the body and the ecolog ical system in which the re-
spective actor is embedded physically and biologically. Third, this model of scientific expla-
nation is old fashioned and does not match with the mechanistic models proposed by philoso-
phers of science and the actual practice of psychologists and neurobiologists whose scientific 
competence should be beyond dispute. 
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5.8.2 Machery‘s critique of Concept Empiricism 
 
I will argue relatively extensively here against Machery (2007) because it is one of the very 
view articles which tries to deal with Concept Empiricism on a large array of topics and 
thereby comprises many possible points of critique.  
One argument marshalled against Concept Empiricism, which might be very elusive to GO-
FAI proponents, assumes that many perceptual representations could in fact be linguistic (cf. 
Pylyshyn 2002). Therefore it is not adequate ―to contrast amodal and perceptual representa-
tions by means of the contrast between linguistic and analogical representations‖ (Machery 
2007). This does not seem very compelling to me. In principle it might also be possible that 
images are in fact linguistic and that the linguistic representations are indeed platonic forms 
which are themselves ideas in the mind of god. But why suppose this? What we can say rela-
tively for sure is that the vehicles that carry images are biological areas in the brain. Why 
should we assume something between the image which does the explanatory job and for 
which we have phenomenological and behavioural evidence and the biological vehicle which 
does the causal job? Only the assumption from GOFAI that the computer-analogy is the best 
explanation for the mind might suggest that language underlies a good explanation for cogni-
tion. But exactly this assumption is attacked by grounded cognition on good grounds.  
Another argument from Machery (2007) is that ―Barsalou and colleagues‘ findings provide 
evidence against specific predictions derived from specific amodal models of the cognitive 
processes involved in the experimental task, not against the amodal approach.‖ What Machery 
states here on behalf of the amodal approach is indeed one of its major weaknesses. That the 
amodal approach can continuously adapt to empirical findings brought forth by Concept Em-
piricists merely shows that the amodal approach is not falsifiable.  
A further problem with this view is that it underestimates the evidence which Concept Em-
piricism as a paradigm can marshal against the classic paradigm in its entirety. It is like sup-
posing that Materialism or special versions of it cannot provide evidence against mentalism as 
a whole but only against special versions of it; eventually against Platonism, but not against 
Plotin‘s Platonism. But if we suppose that there is nothing extra-physical than there is no 
place for Plotin, too, as there is no place for any amodal theory with regard to e.g. meaning 
when there is no plausible conception of what a causally efficacious version of meaning can 
be that is not imaginistic.    86 
 
One of Barsalou‘s findings is direct evidence for ―perceptual work‖ which speaks against 
strong compositionality which is assumed by many classic approaches in GOFAI and analytic 
philosophy of language. Barsalou et al. (1999) found out that people do not simply add fea-
tures in a compositional way when they combine words as in the case: half + watermelon  
half-watermelon or rolled-up + lawn  rolled-up lawn or smiling + face  smiling face. In a 
property listing task Barsalou and co-workers showed that people list typically the features for 
a special word or combination of words which are salient from their imaginistic properties. 
For instance: For ―watermelon‖ most people listed green or rind while they listed for ―half-
watermelon‖ primarily seed or red where ―half‖ should only have affected the amount of the 
watermelon  according  to  classic  assumption  regarding  compositionality.  However,  half-
watermelon leads to imagery of an open watermelon in which case the red pulp and the seeds 
are salient features. This strongly suggests that concepts are grounded in perceptual symbols 
which yields this imaginistic recall. Machery does not believe that this is strong evidence for 
PSST because he believes that there are amodal models which can account for that, too: 
―Of particular interest is Costello and Keane‘s C3 model of concept combination (e.g., 
Costello & Keane, 2000, 2005). A detailed exposition of this model is beyond the scope 
of this article. In substance, complex concepts,  such as HALFWATERMELON, are 
produced in such a way as to satisfy three pragmatic principles, plausibility, diagnostic-
ity, and informativeness. The third principle, informativeness, is important for present 
purposes. Costello and Keane write (2005, p. 212, Machery‘s emphasis): [T]he informa-
tiveness constraint requires that a listener interpreting a compound phrase should con-
struct a combined concept which contains new information that could not have been 
conveyed by either of the constituent words. This requirement is justified by the prag-
matic assumption that the interpretation intended by the speaker  who produced the 
phrase is one for which both words in the phrase are necessary (otherwise, the speaker 
would have used fewer words).  In brief, the informativeness principle supposes that 
when a speaker uses a noun phrase such as ―half watermelon‖, she intends to convey as 
much specific information as possible about the referent of this noun phrase. This prin-
ciple explains why subjects do not follow the simplest strategy for producing complex 
concepts, which is illustrated by the Selective Modification Model. For instance, it ex-
plains why, when people produce the complex concept HALF WATERMELON, they 
do not merely modify the amount dimension of the concept WATERMELON. This 
would violate the informativeness constraint: The interpretation of the noun phrase ―half 87 
 
watermelon‖ would not contain as much specific information about half watermelons as 
possible‖ (Machery 2007, 26-27). 
Here Machery overlooks the distinctiveness of PSST with regard to mechanistic explanations, 
those explanations which are epistemically desirable. Costello and Keane‘s model does only 
describe what is required for a conceptual model to work effective or to work according to 
behavioural evidence. This is somehow comparable to that what contextualists like Recanati 
(2004) do in the philosophy of language. This however is different from explaining something 
by specifying the mechanism which brings those phenomena, which are only described in 
non-mechanistic accounts, about. And this is exactly what PSST does and what makes it epis-
temically superior to models which only describe. 
A further counterargument against PSST from Machery is this: ―It is important to realize that 
our knowledge about the perceptual properties of objects need not be encoded modally, that 
is, by means of perceptual representations. We can have amodal representations of the percep-
tual properties of objects. Indeed, many natural languages sentences, such as ―the apple is 
green‖, represent the perceptual properties of objects in an amodal manner‖ (Machery 2007, 
p. 27). This is indeed grotesque. To argue against PSST by simply stating that something like 
THE APPLE IS GREEN is represented by a sentence in an amodal manner is simply to assert 
something which is under attack by PSST and to invoke it against that theory without justify-
ing it.  
It seems clear that Concept Empiricism can accommodate very well for context sensitivity 
because of its underlying dynamical biological mechanisms. This seems to be a very impor-
tant feature of PSST which makes it truly superior on the architectural level compared to any 
classic theory. But Machery sees a problem for PSS, too, and does not believe that it does the 
job better: 
―It is  erroneous  to  believe that  context-sensitivity  comes  for  free for neo-empiricist 
theories of concepts. It is one thing to say that re-enacted perceptual representations are 
tailored to the current circumstances (e.g., Barsalou, 2003, p. 1180); it is another thing 
to explain what mechanisms underlie the context-sensitivity of re-enacted perceptual 
representations. After all, we could re-enact contextually-inadequate perceptual repre-
sentations. Now, if one tries to spell out which mechanisms underlie context-sensitivity 
in the context of neo-empiricism, one encounters exactly the same problems as when 
one explains context sensitivity in the context of amodal theories. To illustrate, since 88 
 
anything can be relevant to a given circumstance, these mechanisms have to access all 
our long-term perceptual knowledge, without succumbing to some form of computa-
tional explosion. One needs also to know when to stop searching for new perceptual in-
formation, a version of the frame problem. Since relevance is a semantic notion, syntac-
tic views of the nature of our cognitive processes do not seem suited to explain context-
sensitivity and relevance. And so on. The upshot is clear: With respect to relevance, 
neo-empiricism is no better off than the amodal approach‖ (Machery 2007, p. 30-31). 
This argument is not very convincing. Concept Empiricism is committed to the circumstance 
that brains are the lower level parts of the mechanism which brings PSS about. These lower 
level parts constrain by their structure higher level properties like context sensitivity. Brains 
in turn are dynamic, complex and self-organized (cf. Spivey 2007). If we conceive of the 
brain as being in a continuous state space and every point in that space as constraining the 
next one because we are always in a specific state we get a model of cognition which is not 
susceptible to the frame problem for interests are determined through the history of the brain 
and its respective states which do not allow for everything being relevant for everything. The 
states in which the brain is in are very complex and context sensitive but they are however 
finite and confined by means of structure too. These definite structures simply confine the 
bounds of context sensitivity. 
Another important epistemic point from the view of philosophy of science seems to be that a 
theory is falsifiable. A theory which is not falsifiable is definitely inferior to a theory which is 
falsifiable. As an adherent of PSST I consider it to be a good case for it that it is falsifiable. 
Again, Machery (2007) sees that differently:  
―However, Anderson‘s point was not that amodal approaches to cognition can explain 
any piece of evidence. In fact, he has shown that if one relies only on behavioral data, 
process models can be found such that imagistic approaches can explain any piece of 
evidence for amodal, propositional theories of cognition – and vice versa. The correct 
conclusion to be drawn from Anderson‘s argument is that amodal theories and empiri-
cist theories are on a par. Viewed independently of specific models of cognitive proc-
esses, both neo-empiricism and the amodal approach are unfalsifiable. Instead, what is 
falsifiable is a specific amodal theory of representation conjoined with specific models 
of the relevant cognitive processes or a specific empiricist theory of representation con-
joined with specific models of the relevant cognitive processes‖ (p.31). 89 
 
This is again, a massive misconception of Concept Empiricism. It is exactly that what makes 
PSST that strong that it is not relying on behavioural data only. To the opposite, it is propos-
ing a mechanistic explanation which is grounded in the brain and that makes it falsifiable. 
Simmons and Barsalou make also very fine grained assumptions about the structuring of the 
respective feature maps and convergence zones on a neurological level (Simmons and Barsa-
lou 2003). To make the point clear: If we are conceptualizing meaning by imagery and if we 
specify the behavioural instances in which meaning is processed then is it possible to deter-
mine in cases of behavioural meaning processing which brain areas are involved. If then in 
cases of genuine meaning processing no brain area is involved which is underlying perceptual 
processing or imagery then we have a clear empirical case against PSST and it were falsified 
by the evidence. Additionally, the brain imaging studies which showed that perceptual areas 
of the brain are simulated during conceptual tasks as well as the plenty of brain impairment 
studies which showed by means of double dissociation studies that special perceptual and 
motor areas of the brain are involved in conceptual tasks, motivated to a large part Concept 
Empiricism. This suggests further that Machery‘s case is highly unfortunate.        
On pages 34-35 Machery challenges Concept Empiricist assumptions on the ground that they 
eventually methodologically misconceive the phenomena explained. There he discusses Kan‘s 
et al. (2003) findings and their involvement of imagery: 
―Remember, however, the issue singled out in this section. Most proponents of amodal 
theories of concepts and higher cognition recognize that people rely on perceptual simu-
lation to solve some tasks that tap into our higher cognition. If amodal theorists expect 
people to rely on imagery to solve a given task, evidence that people use imagery in this 
task does not constitute evidence for neoempiricism and against the amodal approach to 
concepts and higher cognition. Now, the present task is arguably such a task. Indeed, to 
decide whether something is a part of something else, a reliable strategy is to visualize 
it. Relying on imagery is a reliable strategy to solve the part-whole property verification 
task because in visual imagery, we access some information about the physical structure 
of objects. This is even the best strategy when the part-whole relation (say, wheels-car) 
is not part of the concept of the whole (say, of car). If amodal theorists do expect sub-
jects to rely on imagery in the part-whole property verification task, this task is not ide-
ally suited for distinguishing neo-empiricism and amodal theories of concepts.‖ 
This objection is very similar to that I made hypothetically in the case of the usage based ac-
count theorist above. Machery notices correctly that many proponents of amodal theories are 90 
 
totally happy with allowing imagery to play a large role in the cognitive economy. But this 
need not mean that all cognitive functions and especially concepts must exhibit properties 
typically instantiated in imagery tasks. Fine! But as I objected in return to the hypothetical 
Wittgensteinian, what role do concepts play, when they do not figure large in the many activi-
ties described with the help of mental imagery, which are at the core of our mental life. Now, 
take a look at the example chosen by Machery: It is deciding whether something is part of 
something else. If this does not qualify for a conceptual function what else does? This is clas-
sically one of the most paradigmatic examples for conceptual function both in philosophy and 
psychology! And even if we would not look at the history of concepts in philosophy and psy-
chology and we had to start from the very beginning with our conceptualizing work, this cog-
nitive task would surely qualify as a central conceptual function which is important for acting 
as well as for classical tasks of offline thought.  
 
 
6. Résumé 
 
I hope that I have made a clear case for Concept Empiricism. Having reached the end of my 
Magisterarbeit I would like to point to some consequences and prospects which might follow 
from the ideas presented here.    
It should be more than obvious that the main ideas which were developed here are at odds 
with the Analytic tradition in philosophy, since I propose a dethroning of language and lan-
guage-like structures with regard to the explanation of concepts and meaning, phenomena, 
which we find involved at the core of discussions of nearly every important philosophical 
topic
94. Maybe this is in accord with a more general development which we get aware of at 
                                                           
94 In the sense that concepts are at the very core of the phenomenon itself, as in the case of at least reflective 
self-consciousness, the conceptual self, etc. or in the sense that we are committed to a special methodology 
which recurs to a very special picture of concepts, like in ethics, epistemology or every other topic with regard 
to  which  methods  similar  to  conceptual  analysis  are  utilized.  I  will  shortly  discuss  here  an  example  from 
epistemology: The Smith-and-Jones-and-coins-in-the-pocket-Gettier-case. A conceptual model which grounds 
belief ascription in PSS would for sure come to a different conclusion as came Gettier. I assume that everybody 
is familiar with this case; therefore I will spare the reader with details here. I assume that a PSS model of 
thought wouldn’t seriously allow for Smith’s inference from “Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones 
has ten coins in his pocket” to “The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket”. What Smith would 
actually believe were a PSS presentation of Jones which were determinate with regard to spatial properties, 91 
 
the moment, i.e. that many philosopher‘s in the naturalistic camp embrace Phenomenology 
happily
95. General themes from Phenomenology, as the partial abandonment of the distinction 
between perception and cognition, the  perspective character of all thought or  the predomi-
nance of the first person perspective are indeed to be found in this Magisterarbeit too. 
I believe that the model delivered here posses a high grade of intuitive appeal. Especially if 
you start to study philosophy many pseudo problems from analytic philosophy seem to you 
plain grotesque. An example might be that you normally won‘t see any great problem related 
to the circumstance that you can entertain thoughts about things which do not exist. You will 
ascribe the cause of your thought about unicorns to your creative imagination which is indeed 
responsible for that thought.  
I also suppose that it is intuitively also highly implausible to assume that meaning should be 
related to truth.  If this idea is highly implausible with regard to linguistic structures it is 
merely outrages with regard to non-linguistic structures which are commonly called meaning-
ful, i.e. works of art, music, etc. Representational analysis of these entities are the straightfor-
ward outgrowths of ideas from Analytic Philosophy and in my opinion everything else as in-
tuitive. 
We encounter further outgrowths of the Analytic Program in epistemology were we are seri-
ously told that perception is only a causal precondition of knowledge and that knowledge is 
indeed dependent on e.g. a coherent state of all one‘s believes (cf. BonJour 1988), whereas 
ethics boils down to a boring ―analysis‖ of concepts which primarily reflects the intuitions of 
some Analytic Philosopher‘s, instead of being grounded in biological needs and emotions. I 
hope that it is recognizable from that what I said so far that we will encounter a very different 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
temporal properties and more general properties of Jones. To be more concrete, Smith would have an instance 
of mental imagery which would present Jones and which weren’t that indeterminate with regard to the actual 
referent of the belief as were the ambiguous sentence. However, qualifications are in order. This Gettier case is 
generally a bit sloppy. You could indeed argue that the inference isn’t proper even in the classical case since 
the inferred sentence is much more underdetermined as the sentence from which it is inferred. Further, that 
Smith does not take enough defeaters into account might be a point against the whole case altogether. What I 
am proposing goes however a step further. I assume that the model of entailment and inference which is deli-
vered in the Gettier case is psychologically implausible and that an epistemology which would work with a 
Concept Empiricist model would not deal with such cases because it would have no reason for it, though it 
would even within a Concept Empiricist model be possible to have a more unspecified belief of the sort “The 
man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket”. This indeed lets the possibility open for a more psycho-
logically realistic conception which works with classic language-like belief models. However, this model would 
confront the plethora of problems which I listed in the Magisterarbeit more generally.    
95 Corresponding to that movement the first (known to me) introduction to philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science which is rooted in Phenomenology and not in the Analytic tradition was published only recently (cf. 
Gallagher and Zahavi 2008).  92 
 
philosophical landscape if we adhere to Concept Empiricism instead of some more or less 
analytically inspired competitor. 
Besides these more or less critical remarks regarding the Analytic tradition I would like to 
suggest some tasks which have to be accomplished in the future in order to make the Concept 
Empiricist framework more powerful. 
There is for example the problem of a genuine motor- or action-intentionality. My remarks 
regarding intentionality were primarily concerned with a perceptual relation between mind 
and world which might indeed support action but which is different from a genuine action-
intentionality which might be subserved by visuomotor-representations. It would indeed be 
interesting to know if there were more than one intentionality relation and how these different 
intentionality relations relate to the unity of consciousness.  
Another problem, as I already stated, is the examination of unconscious processing with re-
gard to meaning and the role of consciousness in the process of meaning generation more 
generally
96. This is a very tricky problem and deserves proper treatment. Somehow related is 
the problem of space and time. A theory of  intentionality and meaning should get a massive 
refinement if those both important aspects of our cognition are incorporated in that theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
96 This is especially interesting if we consider unconscious animals which perform complex tasks, especially 
those ascribed to target consciousness (cf. Campbell 2004). Are humans or other conscious animals dramatical-
ly cognitively enhanced with regard to those tasks or is there no need for target consciousness? What is then 
the role of consciousness in the meaning generation process? 93 
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung der Magisterhausarbeit „Concept Empiricism: Vehicle, 
Meaning and Intentionality.“ 
 
In der hier vorliegenden Magisterhausarbeit entwickele ich eine Theorie von Begriffen und 
somit auch von Bedeutung und Intentionalität, die in dem Embodied and Embedded Mind 
Paradigma verankert ist. Dabei beziehe ich mich maßgeblich auf die Begriffstheorie von Law-
rence Barsalou, die sogenannte Perceptual Symbol Systems Theorie.  
Neben einer allgemeinen Darstellung des Paradigmas, stelle ich zu Beginn der Arbeit die 
Perceptual Symbol Systems Theorie von Barsalou dar, sowie weitere begriffliche Werkzeuge, 
die es möglich machen, eine im Körper gegründete Begriffstheorie zu entwickeln: Simulation, 
Emulation und Neuronale Ausbeutung (neural exploitation). Dieser Teil ist primär darstel-
lend. 
Der daraufhin folgenden Abschnitte der Magisterarbeit entwickeln primär eine Konzeption 
von Begriffsempirismus, so wie ich ihn mir vorstelle. Dabei diskutiere ich ausführlich das 
Phänomen „Bedeutung― und komme dabei zum Schluss, dass es sich bei Bedeutung um etwas 
handelt, das radikal verschieden von dem ist, wie es speziell die analytische Tradition in der 
zeitgenössischen  Philosophie  gezeichnet  hat.  Bedeutung  ist  demnach  primär  ein  senso-
motorisches Phänomen, dass für Handlungen evolvierte und dass auf quasi-imaginistischen 
Mechanismen ruht. Bedeutung ist primär weniger repräsentational als vielmehr phänomenal 
präsentational und internalistisch. Ich entwickele diese Theorie von Bedeutung vor dem Hin-
tergrund von philosophischen Argumenten wie dem symbol grounding Argument oder dem 
chinese room argument als auch vor dem Hintergrund neuropsychologischer Theorien wie 
z.B. der mental imagery Theorie von Kosslyn oder der Begriffstheorie von Barsalou. Neben 
dem positiven Teil der Theorieentwicklung, diskutiere ich auch eine Vielzahl von Einwänden, 
die gegen klassische Theorien vorgebracht wurden, die teilweise größere Ähnlichkeit zu der 
hier entwickelten Theorie haben. 
Im Anschluss daran, versuche ich, eine Theorie von Intentionalität auszuarbeiten, die es er-
möglicht, dass Intentionalität als quasi emergentes Phänomen entsteht und nicht, wie es üblich 
ist, durch umständliche und problematische ad hoc Erklärungen eingebracht wird. Dabei gehe 
ich davon aus, dass die biologischen Mechanismen, die auch Bedeutung erklären, größtenteils 
dazu beitragen, Intentionalität zu erklären, wobei Intentionalität eine konkrete Relation zwi-
schen einem Ding in der Welt, einem Perzept und einem Begriff ist. Die stark objektivistische 112 
 
und metaphysisch realistische Tendenz klassischer Referenz und Intentionalitätstheorien wird 
dabei zurückgewiesen. Für die Kritik an klassischen Theorien arbeite ich 12 Punkte heraus, 
die es erlauben, schwere Zweifel hinsichtlich eben jener klassischen Theorien zu haben. Ich 
schließe die Intentionalitätsdiskussion mit einer Betrachtung des Pseudophänomens intentio-
nal-intensionaler Kontexte ab und schlage ein Modell vor, dass dieses Phänomen zurückweist.  
Daraufhin behandele ich ontologische Probleme hinsichtlich meiner Position. Ich gebe dabei 
praktisch zwei Lösungsvorschläge ab. Der eine ist maßgeblich durch das Mechanistische Pa-
radigma und die Heuristische  Identitätstheorie aus  der Wissenschaftstheorie motiviert und 
setzt Phänomene und Mechanismen in ein enges Verhältnis. Der andere weist ontologische 
Fragestellungen zurück und bezieht sich dabei vor allem auf die phänomenologische Traditi-
on.  
Den letzten großen Teil der Magisterhausarbeit macht  eine Zurückweisung von konkreter 
Kritik am Begriffsempirismus aus. Dabei diskutiere ich neben der klassischen Kritik von Fo-
dor und Pylsyshyn, die relativ generell ist, hauptsächlich Edouard Macherys Kritik, die sich 
konkret gegen Barsalou und Prinz richtet. 
Die Magisterhausarbeit schließt mit einem Resümee, das vor allem die Probleme, die sich aus 
meiner Position ergeben, darstellt und schildert, was zukünftig in den Fokus philosophischer 
Diskussion rücken sollte.  
 